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CX x. CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR. (Bust in the Museum of the Louvre.)
oO
CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR
(ALLEN AND GREENOUGH'S EDITION)
REEDITED BY
JAMES B. GREENOUGH
BENJAMIN L. D'OOGE AND M. GRANT DANIELL
GINN AND COMPANY
BOSTON : NEW YORK *: CHICAGO + LONDON ATLANTA * DALLAS : COLUMBUS * SAN FRANCISCO
|.
COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY GINN AND COMPANY
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
432 4
Zhe Athenaum- Press a,
GINN AND COMPANY : PRO- PRIETORS + BOSTON * U.S.A.
PREFACE.
—— DÓ—
THE editors have undertaken the task of reéditing entirely the well-known Allen & Greenough's Cesar, to satisfy the ever- increasing demands of modern secondary education. In view of the improvements lately made in the text of Cesar by Meusel and others, they have changed the readings in many places, following chiefly Meusel's as almost a new ¢extus recep- tus. Most of the changes will at once commend themselves. The editors have in general been conservative in regard to spelling, especially the new spelling of old Gallic names, feeling that much that is proposed of that kind as yet lacks certainty. But they have adopted the spelling -18 for the accusative plural of i-stems in accordance with the prevailing usage. They have allowed themselves full liberty in enriching the notes as to grammar, exegesis, and subject-matter. They have added very full suggestions for parallel reading, and have spared no pains to enrich the study of this famous piece of literature. The trea- tises on military affairs and other introductory matters have been rewritten and brought out of the notes under one head, so that a pupil may have a chance to gain some general infor- mation before he begins to read. Special attention has been given to indirect discourse, the bugbear of Latin education, and throughout the earlier books the direct form has been printed in full in the notes, that any teacher who desires may
iv Preface.
begin either the first or second book and avoid at the start the enormous difficulties of the indirect form. They have endeav- ored to put in every kind of illustration that might tend to make the story more real to the pupil's imagination.
In order to encourage pupils to associate words together for acquiring a vocabulary they have made a large number of groups of words containing the same elements without intro- ducing the vague notion of roots. It is hoped that these may be found convenient to learn by heart, at least in some measure. Attention is also called to the foot-notes which have been added to the text. In the first four books these refer backward to some previous use of the same word. In the last three books reference is made to words of similar or opposite meaning, whereby it is thought that sight-reading may be facilitated. The editors have not thought it desirable to give any pronouncing vocabulary of proper names, as generally these may be pro- nounced in the Latin manner, except those few that are familiar enough to have become English words, like Caesar and Cicero, which of course must be pronounced like English. The vocab- ulary has been enriched by a fuller insertion of idioms, and the etymological matter has been made clearer without sacrificing its peculiar character.
B. G. . L. D. . G. D.
|» n
APRIL, 1898.
CONTENTS.
—9——
Pace
List OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS . . . , . . vii INTRODUCTION.
I. Lirg or CASAR . . . . . . , . = xiii
II. ROMAN MILITARY AFFAIRS . TP . xxix
III. GAUL AND THE GAULS . e , . . . xlv
IV. THE Britons. . . e . . . . lii
| V. | THE GERMANS 000. 5. — . ^ o» ». . Hi
VI. THE CAMPAIGNS IN GAUL o. ll liv VII. READING CounsES . . . . . . . lv VIII. DIRECTIONS FOR READING . . . . . lvii
Book I . . " . . . . . . . . . I Boox II . e$] 9 9 9 759 2-4* c$] 59 ^. — 49 Book III . . . , , . e e . . - 74 Boox IV e 9 759 c9 $4, c5 c5 c o5 94 Book Va. e; e e "M . . . . oO Wy Boox VI e| mo no TP C LZ LT 157 Book VII . TEC LL ZO "M e . 186 Norzs .. . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Groups OF RELATED WORDS . . . eo . 5 443 , VOCABULARY.
LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.
ABBREVIATIONS.
Babelon. — Description historique et chro- nologique des Monnaies de la Répub- lique romaine. 1885.
Baumeister.— Denkmiler des klassischen Altertums. 1884-88.
Bertrand and Perrot.— Revue archeolo- gique, 3* Série, Tome X.
Cekex. — Description générale des Mon- nales de la République romaine, etc. 1857.
Fleury. — Antiquités et Monuments du département de l'Aisne, etc. 1877-78.
Proekner. — La Colonne trajane d'aprés le surmoulage exécuté à Rome en 1861- 62, reproduite en phototypographie par Gustave Arosa. 1872.
von Géler. — Caesar's Gallischer Krieg, etc. 1880.
Grasset.-- Costumes de Guerre de l'age du bronze et de l'ére gauloise. 1886.
Ga and Kohner.— The Life of the Greeks
and Romans, described from Antique Monuments. 1875.
Head. — A Guide to the Principal Gold and Silver Coins of the Ancients. (Br. Mus.) 1881.
Jeuffrais.— Essai d'Interprétation de Types de quelques Médailles muettes, émises par les Celtes-Gaulois. 1846.
von Kampen. — XV ad Caesaris de Bell. ‘Gall. Commentarios Tabulae. 1879.
Lindenschmidt.— Tracht und Bewaffnung des Rómischen Heeres wahrend -der Kaiserzeit, etc. 1883. .
OeMer. — Bilder-Atlas zu Caesars Büchern de Bell. Gall. :89o.
Reinhard. — C. Iulii Caesaris Commen- tarii de Bell. Gall. 1896.
Schreiber. — Atlas of Classical Antiquities.
Stoffel. — Guerre de César et d'Arioviste. 1890.
Visconti. — Iconographie romaine. 1817-24.
Fic. PacE I. Caesar. Bust in the Museum of the Louvre . Frontispiece. 2. Map of Gaul.
3. Campaign map of B.C. 58 . . I 4- Two coins of Cesar. (1) Obverse : “head of Venus. Re- verse: /Eneas with Anchises and the palladium. CAE- SAR. (2) Obverse: head of Venus. Reverse: trophy and captives. CAESAR. Mead... se I
ae
Map of Helvetia. Ochler
Pas de l'Ecluse (looking down stream). Photgraph PN 5
List of Maps and Illustrations.
Junction of the Rhéne and Saéne (looking south). Phote- graph. ..
Coin of Piso. Obverse: head of a youth with winged diadem; behind, a star and crown; before, a simum. Reverse: M. PISO. M[arci] F[ilius] FRUGI; a patera and a secesfita, inclosed within a laurel wreath. Cohen .
Coin of Cassius. Obverse: head of Apollo with sceptre be- hind. Reverse: Q.CASSIUS. Eagle resting on a thun- derbolt, between a /stuus and a pracfericulum. Cohen
Loading boats with supplies. /rochner . . . . . .
Gallic remains. Grasseé . . . .
. Cavalryman charging. Gravestone i in Mainz. Ockler
Cavalryman with vexiiium. Col. of M. Aurelius. Ockler Soldiers marching with packs (sarcinac). Frochkner
Roman javelins (Za). Ochler . . . oe ew Plan of battle with the Helvetii. vos Kampen . . Roman swords. OeMer. . . . e eco |
View of Besancon (Vesontio). From a drawing ee C. Marius. Impression of a coin. Visconti . "m View of the fortress of Belfort. Photograph . .
Coin of the Fabian family. Obverse: ROMA Q. MAX. Laurelled head of Apollo, lyre in front. Reverse: horn of plenty filled with fruits; thunderbolts; the whole in a wreath of grain ears and poppy. Cohen . . eon
Map of the campaign with Ariovistus. Stoffel
Soldiers attacked while encamping. Frockner . . . .
Ostheim, looking towards Zellenberg. Photograph « 2
Plan of battle with Ariovistus. .Sfofe . . . oe ee
Campaign map of B.C. 57. . . ,
Writing materials : atramentarium (for black and red ink); papyrus letter sealed and addressed (M LVCRETIO FLAM[ini] MARTIS DECVRIONI POMPEI([s]) ; di?- fycha (folding tablet), s///ws, and erasing knife. Wall painting. Overbeck's Pompeii
Gaul with trumpet. Restoration from carvings. on | the Are ve de Triomphe at Orange. Grasset . .
Coin of Diviciacus, king of the Suessiones. Fleury
Slinger ( funditor). | Dict. des Antiquités "PM
Berry au Bac. Photograph . . . «6 6 «© + © « © © ©
Battle on the Aisne. Ochler . 2. . 6 6 2 2 we ww
Pacas
IO
PERE PE ROREEE Y
ESS S
List of Maps and Illustrations.
Vinea or Testudo. OeMer . . . . 2 2 2 ew . Hautmont. Photograph . . . . 2 © © © © © n Defeat of the Nervi. Ochler . . . . €. Lituus .. . . . «.. we te ew ew nr oth on on onm n n Comu . . .. . e| o9 o9 9 s t| n n n. Aquilifer. Lindenschmidt e] om om o9 o m tm 0n ng Centurio. Lindenschmidt . . . . . . 2 . .. Citadel of Namur. Photograph ee ew ee on. Siege of the stronghold of the Aduatuci. From first ed. Siege works. vom Gfer . . . . .
Gallic coins. (1) Obverse: a Gaul running, with. torch in one hand and /ergwe (?) in the other. Reverse: bear (?). (2) Obverse: ox-head. Reverse: bear of the Helvetii. Fleury . .
(3 (4) Of uncertain interpretation. Some modification of the human head is seen, also the form of a horse or boar, with ornaments. J/ewffraim . . see
Shipbuilder. Grave relief (Ravenna). Schreiber .
Map of Octodurus. von Kampen e
Casar. Bust in the British Museum "M
Galley. From the Praeneste relief. Baumeister 2 os
Map of the Veneti neighborhood. Altered from modern
map View at mouth of the Loire. Photograph . . Roman battle ship. Wall painting at Pompeii. Ockler . Trading vessel. Ancient relief. Baumeister . . . Gallic sword-blade. Museum at Namur. Plotgraph Soldiers making camp. roeásmer . . Pack-wagons and carts. Col. of M. Aurelius. Ockler’ Campaign map of B.C. 56-53 m . Coins of Csesar. (1) Obverse: head of Venus. Reverse: trophy of Gallic arms. CAESAR. (2) Obverse: veiled head of Pietas. CAESAR CO[n]S(u]TER. Reverse: iituus, pracfericulum, and axe. Abe] HIRTIUS PR[aefectus]. Head . .. . oe ee Scenery on the Meuse. Pholgropk . Bridge. From firsted. . . . Cliffs of Dover. “ Shakespeare' 8 Cliff. » " Photograph . Catapulta Modern restoration. . . . . . . « . «
Pas.
REE SS
91.
92.
List of Maps and Illustrations.
PaGE
Anchor and tackle. Ave de Triomphe at Orange. Schreiber xa xa Soldiers foraging. Freekmer . . .. zr3 Gallic coin. /ewfraiw. . . . . . . . . . . . . . EEG Map of campaigns in Britain . . . 1x6 British coins. (1) Obverse: ear of grain, CAMV[lodunum]. Reverse: prancing horse, CVNOp[belinus] (the Cymbeline of Shakespeare). (2) Obverse: unexplained devices.
Reverse: horse, TASCOVIANUS. Head . . . . . 1937 Boulogne. Photograph . . . . . . . . © . © . . 1x8 Testudo. Frohmer . . e..52.5 183
Soldiers building camp, with guards. Froehner . 2.5.5 I28 Signa Militaria. GwÁlamd Komer . . . . . . . . . 129 Roman Transports. Frochner. . . . 132 Coin of L. Plancus. Obverse: bust of Victory. 'CAES[ar].
DIC[tator] TER. Reverse: a Praefericwem. — L.
PLANC[us]. PRAEF(ectus). Head . . . . . . . ¥34 Hollow square. Col. of M. Aurelius. OceMer . . . . . 139 Roman camp assaulted. FxoAmer . . . . . . . . . 143 Ballista. Modern restoration . . . . 146 Gallic coin. Obverse: human figure seated. Reverse :
bear, serpent, and stars. /ewfraim . . . 0.5. 362 Gallic torques. Museum at Namur. Photograph 0.55. «S56 Czsar. Bust in the Naples Museum. . 0.55 157 Gallic chief. Museum at Avignon. Photograph . 5. . . 160 Bridge. Model in the Museum of St. Germain. OeAMer . 162
Gallic coin. /ewffrain. . . 166
Gallic coins. LVCOTI (Paris »; ; human eye. in protie s sup- posed to symbolize the sun. Fleury . . . . 168
Statue of Ambiorix at Tongres. Photograph. . . . . . 174
Sacrifice in camp. Military band (Cormicines). Froehmer |. 178 Soldiers marching in presence of the Imperator. Frockner 183
Chain mail Fragment found at Mainz. Ochler . . . . 185 Helmets. Schreiber . . 1 . . . ee ww . . . . 186 Campaign map of B.C. 52... . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Coin of Brutus and Albinus. Obverse: head of Mars. Reverse: ALBINVS BRVTI Fr[ilius] Two Gallic
trumpets crossed, oval and round shields. Head . . . t9t Siege of Avaricum. vos Kampen . . . . . . . . . 104 Bourges. Photograph. . . . . © © © © © © «= © « 196
View of siege works. von Kampen . . . . . . . . . 198
110.
112. 113.
I15. 116, 117, 118, Ug, 120,
List of Maps and Illustrations.
Plan of siege works. vos Kampen . . . M
Gallic wall. Model in the Museum of St. Germain, slightly restored from existing remains at Murcens. Ochler.
Scorpio. Modern restoration .
Coin of the Bituriges. Obverse: beardless male head. Reverse : galloping horse, flying eagle above; below three circles. ABVDOS (name of chief?). Head . .
Siege of Gergovia. OceMer . . . «© . . 2 e s
Care of the wounded. Froechner . . . . . . . © . .
Expeditio LabienL von Kampen . e| or or n on.
Defeat of Vercingetorix at the Vingeanne. vom Kampen
Alise Ste. Reine (Alesia). Photograph .
Siege of Alesia. Ochler .
View of Caesar's line of works before Alesia. Model i in the Museum of St. Germain. Ochler .
Light-armed soldier. Lindenschmidt.
Archer. Lindenschmidt . . .
Statue of Vercingetorix. Erected at Alesia by order of Napo leon III. Designed by Bartholdi. Photograph . . The legionary. Slightly altered from Bartholdi’s Model in
the Museum of St. Germain.
Coin of Caesar. Obverse: head of Augustus. IMP- [erator] CAESAR: DIVI-F-[itius]ITI(trium)-VIR-ITER[um] R[ei] P[ublicae] C[onstituendae]. Reverse: Julius Cesar stand- ing inatemple. DIVO IVL[io]. Star and altar. CO[n]. S[ul] ITER[(um]-ET. TER-DESIG[natus). Cohen
Gallic coin. Fleury . . . . . . 6 2 0 we ee
Gallic coin. Obverse: horse. VIRO (perhaps name of a chief), or VIRO[mandui]. Reverse: various devices. Fleury
- Gallic coin. Rude representation of a human head. Fleury
Gallic coin. Horse, stars, circles. Fleury
Gallic coin. Cock. Fleury. .
Signifer. Lindenschmidt . .. .. .. «@ Soldiers. From firsted.. . . . . + . « . . © «© » Scutum. Rhetnhard . . . . . 2 0 0 4 4 tw tw ew n Scutum. Rheinhard . . . . 6 . . 4 e ew tw wt rn Wall and ditch. OeAMer . . . . . . . . . te ew «. «. Castra Romana. Rheinhatd . . . emo ee General view of siege operations. Rheinhard TP
PAcGR 199
202 204
207 209 216 225 231 232 234
241 241
124.
125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132
List of Maps and Illustrations.
Vexillum . . . . 2 . .. 4 te rr tt s Aquila... ‘ e$] 8 Gallic coin. Reverse: L Hoetilius Sasem[a]. Warrior fighting, armed with spear and shield, in a Gallic chariot (essedum) driven by a charioteer holding a whip. Sadelon. Gallic coin. Reverse: Warrior armed with spear and shield, and holding a Gallic trumpet (carayx), standing in a two- wheeled chariot, drawn by two galloping horses. L[ucius] LIC[inius] CN [aeus] pow[ds) Bertrand & Perret .
Caliga. Ochler . . . * > ee on | Oppugnatio. From first ed. e 9 9| o o; 9 o£; ot n n Signum . . . re o9 o o 9 on
Tabernaculum. Rheinhard . co ee we ew o o on Pluteus. Modem restoration . . . . . ...
Pluteus. Modem restoration . . . . . . . © . . « Lilium. Ochler . . .. . . . . © ee tw e n onm on Stimulus. OeMer . . . . . . 4 © © © © cr n on
INTRODUCTION.
I. THE LIFE OF CAIUS JULIUS C/ESAR.
** Julius Caesar, whose remembrance yet Lives in men's eyes, and will to ears and tongues Be theme and hearing ever." — Shakespeare.
** The greatest name in history." — Merivale.
I. THE POLITICAL CONDITION OF ITALY IN TRE FIRST CENTURY B.C.
THE Roman state was in form and name a commonwealth or republic. While Rome was a small agricultural community and her citizens a body of patriotic, sturdy, and independent freeholders, the task of government was easy and the constitution well adapted to its purpose. The wars that followed for the establishment and extension of her power at first fostered unity and soundness of national life. But in course of time Rome became an imperial state and took upon herself the guardianship of every country in the world. Wealth flowed into her coffers from every quarter of the earth, her citizens became corrupt, and the rule of the people became the rule of a rich landed aristocracy, whose principal ambi- tion was to perpetuate its mischievous power. The organ of this aristocracy was the senate, a body of six or seven hundred men, who became members of it nominally by virtue of holding certain high offices, and who remained senators for life. In theory, therefore, the senate was elective, and rested on the popular will; but the members really became such on account of noble blood, wealth, or political, social, or other influence. Moreover, the great offices of the state came to be bought and sold openly and without shame, and oppos- ing factions contended not with ballots alone, but with iron and
xiv Introduction.
steel, so that the election place was frequently stained with the blood of the slain. It became increasingly difficult for one not possessing” and willing to use such means to be elected to any office.
Opposed to the landed aristocracy was a class of wealthy capital- ists known as egtwifes, the * Equestrian Order." Many of these were as rich as the senators, but their wealth — most of it gained by usury, state contracts, slave-dealing, and tax-gathering — consisted. of money instead of land. They took no active interest in politics excepting so far as they could influence legislation to their advan- tage by lobbying and bribing.
There was no industrious middle class among the free citizens of Rome. Manufacture on a large scale, as a means of wealth, was absolutely unknown ; while all mechanical industries were carried on by slaves. The poorer class of citizens, the $/eds, were wholly influ- enced in their votes by their wealthy patrons or by scheming dema- gogues. The freedmen were the only class who could become rich by industry.
The rural portions of Italy were for the most part held in large plantations (/atz/undia), owned by nobles and cultivated by slaves, or, more frequently, occupied by great droves of cattle. "This plan- tation system had crowded out the free peasant proprietors in almost all parts of the peninsula. After throwing up their farms, which foreign competition had made unprofitable, they flocked to Rome to swell the idle mob that lived on what their votes would bring. There still remained, especially in Northern Italy, a considerable body of small land owners; and the municipal towns (municifia), about four hundred in number, whose territories comprised, politi- cally speaking, the whole area of Italy, were still the home of a fairly prosperous middle class. These had all received Roman citi- zenship after the social war (B.C. 90) and might, by their substantial character and intelligence, have served as a strong opposition to the corrupt aristocracy at Rome; but they lacked organization and leadership, and when they went to Rome to vote, they were wholly powerless against the turbulent political clubs of the metropolis, whose violence was a regular feature of all public proceedings. Yet in this class alone was the old Roman virtue to be found, and in
it lay whatever hope there was to redeem the state.
The Life of Caius Julius Casar. xv
Another menace to the government was in the constitution of the armies. After a man had been consul, he was given charge of a province and was put in command of several legions. While abroad he was not amenable to the government at home, and when he returned he used his old soldiers to further his political schemes, and rewarded them at the expense of the opposing faction, often by whólesale spoliation and murder.
Partisans of the nobility were known as Of/imates ; jose opposed to them as Populares. Before Cesar, the most conspicuous leader of the former had been Sulla, of the latter, Marius, Cesar's uncle by marriage. These two men by their thirst for power and mutual hatred filled all Italy with bloodshed and terror for years. Under the established régime there was no continuity in government, but a perpetual see-saw between rivals. Rome was kept in a constant electioneering excitement accompanied by the worst forms of demorali- zation. All the vast interests of the Roman world were sacrificed to the luxury and ambition of a governing class wholly incompetent for its task ; and the only resource against anarchy appears to have been that some one man, by craft or by force, should get all the reins of
power into his single hand. That man was destined to be Julius Cesar.
II. CagSAR'S EARLIER CAREER.
* Better be first, he said, in a little Iberian village, Than be second in Rome." — Longfellow.
Caius Julius Cesar (Gaius Julius Caesar) was born July 12th, B.c. 100, or, according to some authorities, two years earlier. Assuming the later date, he was six years younger than Pompey, his great rival, and Cicero, the distinguished orator. His ancestry was of the noblest, and was supposed to reach back on his mother’s side to Ancus Marcius, the Roman king, and on the father's to /Eneas, the founder of the Roman nation and reputed to be the son of a goddess.
The time of his birth was during the great ascendancy of the Populares under Marius, his uncle; and his childhood was passed amid the horrors of the proscriptions that marked Marius’s dictator- ship. Though Cesar was connected by blood with the oldest and
xvi Introduction.
proudest houses of Rome, he early showed his predilection for the party of the people; and the sturdy Marius, with all his defects, doubtless exercised a marked influence over the life and destinies of his young nephew. Cesar lost his father early in life, so that most of the responsibility for his education and bringing up rested upon his mother, Aurelia. She was a typical matron of the old school, managing her house with simplicity and frugality, and holding to the traditions and virtues of the ancient Romans. Tacitus, the Roman historian, couples her name with that of Cornelia, the famous mother of the Gracchi. Czsar owed much of his future greatness to her influence, and his love and reverence for her are highly honorable to both.
In the year 86, when Cesar was still a boy, he was appointed a priest of Jupiter. This office was a perfunctory one and bad little real religious significance. In 83 he married Cornelia, the daughter of Cinna, an act which identified him thus early with the Pofs/ares ; for Cinna was a very prominent leader of that party. It was soon after this that Sulla, the leader of the Opsimates, returned from Asia Minor with a victorious army, prepared to take a terrible revenge for the proscription of Marius. Casar soon fell under his displeasure because of his relationship to Marius. He was ordered to divorce his young wife because she was Cinna's daughter. In this crisis Cesar showed a prominent trait of his character, a trait which led him during all his life to brave every danger rather than allow himself to be controlled. Though but a youth, he refused to obey Sulla’s command. A price was set on his head and he was obliged to flee for his life. Often he was in great peril, and once he was taken, and escaped only by bribing his captor. His friends interceded for him, pleading his youth, and finally obtained his par- don, Sulla saying, * Take him, since you will have it so ; but I would have you know that the youth for whom you are so earnest, will one day overthrow the aristocracy. I see in him many Mariuses."
Cesar thinking it safer to leave Italy for a time went to Asia Minor, where he gained some military experience and distinguished himself for valor by saving a comrade’s life. Sulla died in 78 and Casar returned to his family and resumed his studies. He was a diligent and thorough student and doubtless followed the usual course
The Life of Caius Julius Casar. xvii
of Greek, rhetoric, grammar, philosophy, and oratory. To be a good speaker was essential to political success, and Czsar was especially anxious to excel in that direction. He gave some public exhibitions of his skill and won much applause; but anxious to perfect himself still farther he went to Rhodes in 76, to study under Apollonius Molon, the most famous teacher of oratory and rhetoric of the day. On this journey, when near Miletus, he was captured by pirates and held for a heavy ransom. He spent some time among them while waiting for the money, and joined in their sports and games with the greatest freedom, at the same time assuring them that he would hang them all as soon as he was free. They seem to have regarded him with mingled awe and admiration. The ransom was paid. Cesar was released, went at once to Miletus, where he hastily collected a few ships and made a descent on the pirates before they dreamt of danger. He recovered the ransom money and punished the pirates as he had threatened.
On his return to Rome, he began his political career (B.c. 68) by serving as quaestor, an office connected with the public treasury and the first step toward the consulship. This was followed in 65 by the edileship. The taking of this office, which was one of the chief magistracies, though it involved only the care of the public buildings and the oversight of the great festivals and games, was considered a direct bid for a future consulship, and a man's claims upon that higher office were determined in large measure by the lavishness and splendor of his zdileship. Caesar was poor, but with characteristic boldness he played for the highest political stakes and did not hesi- tate to incur enormous debts, in fact so enormous that those who had not the most perfect confidence in his capacity and his powers believed him irretrievably ruined. His szdileship surpassed all before it in magnificence; but he left it —as he remarked with grim humor — worth more than a million dollars less than nothing.
After his zedileship he identified himself more and more with the popular faction, and even dared to restore some of the statues and tropbies of Marius, which had been banished from sight seventeen years before by the order of Sulla. The people began to hope for a successful revival of the Marian party and to look to Cesar as its leader.
xviii Introduction.
In B.c. 63 he was elected fontifex maximus against the strong opposition of the Optimates. This office was one of great political power and dignity, though not formally a civil office. Casar held it for the rest of his life. In 62 he was elected praetor, an office of a judicial character, and this was followed by a year of command in Spain as propretor. Before leaving for Spain, his creditors became insistent and threatened to detain him unless he paid them. Caesar then obtained a large loan from the richest man in Rome, Crassus, who was ambitious for office and doubtless hoped to make good use in turn of Caesar's brilliant abilities to further his own ends.
In Spain Cesar gained valuable military experience and made his
administration so profitable to himself, as was usual with provincial governors, that, though he left Rome owing millions of sesterces, he returned in the year 60 with enough money to pay all his debts. His design was to run for the consulship, the highest office in the gift of the people. To secure his election he effected a union of interests between himself and Crassus and Pompey. These were the two most powerful men in Rome, — Crassus because of his wealth, Pom- pey because of his fame as a general and his popularity with the army. The latter was, in fact, really the first man in the state. He had but recently returned from Asia Minor laden with the spoils of the Mithridatic war, and might easily have seized the dictatorship had he so chosen ; but he disbanded his army and preferred to appear as a private citizen, but with almost autocratic power. He had quar- reled with Crassus, but Caesar reconciled them, and the three formed a sort of offensive and defensive alliance known as the first trium- virate, — what we should call a political deal. This was for Cesar, who was at that time quite their inferior in fame and influence, a master stroke of craft and diplomacy.
In 59 Czsar was elected consul almost without opposition. He well understood the critical condition of affairs and saw clearly the dangers that threatened the state, and instituted valuable reforms looking to itsregeneration and salvation. The army and the moneyed classes represented by Pompey and Crassus were with him, and he could do almost as he pleased. His first act was the passage of an agrarian law, by which thousands of acres were to be distributed to the poor. This was not a mere act of bribery, but an attempt to
The Life of Caius Julius Casar. xix
restore the peasant freeholders, who had been dispossessed by the rich. Then he passed the excellent body of laws known as the Leges Juliae, which mark an epoch in Roman jurisprudence, and which were devised in the interests of individual rights, purity of justice, morality, and good government. All that one man could do in a single year to save his country from anarchy, Cesar did.
Casar was now forty-three years of age. With the exception of the time spent in Spain, his life had been employed in petty miser- able contests with Roman factions. He longed for a new and larger field where he might have freedom to perform deeds worthy of his surpassing abilities and unbounded ambition. This opportunity came to him when, as proconsul, he was entrusted with the protection of the northern frontier against the Gauls, and was assigned the prov- inces of Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul and Illyricum. It was a most hazardous post and doubtless many of the Opsimates thought that they were well rid of him.
III. CasarR IN GAUL. '* What security men derive from a resolute spirit," — Ceser.
By the ‘deal’ of the triumvirate, Cesar was to have the govern- ment of Gaul for five years, while Crassus and Pompey were to remain in the city to look after the interests of the coalition. The bond was farther strengthened by the marriage of Pompey with Julia, Cesar’s young and beautiful daughter.
Casar, as we have seen, was over forty when he went to Gaul. — He was more of a civilian than a soldier and was far more at home in the Forum than in the camp. Alexander, Hannibal, and Napoleon had been trained in war from childhood. The qualities that are most potent in war—- hope, confidence, audacity, and pugnacity — are qualities that belong to youth. So Cesar is an anomaly in military history. In spite of his years and his comparative inexperience, he leaped at once to the highest place, and is counted to-day among the three or four greatest generals in history, if not the greatest of them all. He never lost a set battle and he showed infinite versa- tility in adapting means to ends, always doing the right thing at the
xx Introduction.
right time. He never admits the possibility of defeat and overcomes the most stupendous difficulties with such ease that he rarely speaks of them. His promptness of decision and rapidity of execution were such that the enemy were constantly overwhelmed with awe and were led to regard him as a supernatural being. ‘ Forced marches,’ ‘continuous marching day and night,’ ‘as quickly as possible’ are phrases that recur again and again in his narrative. Only a natural ruler of men could get things done with such swiftness. He carried out his plans with the greatest audacity and, at the same time, with- out recklessness. No one could be more minute and thorough in preparations than he. No one left less chance for luck, good or bad, to enter into the result. In all that was done, his was the masterful and presiding genius, and the legions rarely accomplished much in his absence. His relations with his soldiers were most cordial. They idolized him and he respected and admired them and constantly labored for their safety and comfort. He allows them to share in the glory of his victories and in his story lingers with delight over their heroic exploits. He shared all their dangers and privations, he excelled personally in deeds of arms, and he allowed himself no luxury but a favorite horse. It is not strange that when trouble came upon their master, his soldiers were true to him, and even volunteered to serve without pay. Only three of his officers, two of them Gauls, went over to the enemy, while thousands came to him from the other side. | After two successful campaigns in Gaul, in the spring of B.c. 56,
Casar met his two confederates at Luca, in Etruria, to arrange their future schemes. The conference was held with great display, almost like a royal court. More than two hundred senators were present, and one hundred and twenty lictors were in attendance, attached to the several magistrates. At this conference it was agreed that Pom- pey and Crassus should hold the consulship the following year, and, after their term of office, should receive by popular vote a similar command to that held by Cesar,— namely, that Pompey should command in Spain and Crassus in Syria for five years each ; also that when Caesar's five years were up, he should receive in the same way a second term of five years. His ten years’ adminis tration would then close at the end of B.C. 49; after which time
The Life of Caius Julius Cesar. xxi
——an interval of ten years having elapsed — he would be eligible again as consul.
The programme was duly carried out. Crassus departed (B.c. 54) to his province, where he was defeated the next year by the Parthians in the battle of Carrhz, and shortly after entrapped and killed. Pompey put his provin@e into the hands of one of his subordinates, and remained in the neighborhood of Rome, unwilling to remove from the seat of his personal influence.
Casar served eight campaigns in Gaul, an account of which is contained in the eight books of his Commentaries. Seven of these he wrote himself. The eighth was written by his friend and staff- officer, Hirtius. During these years he stormed more than 800 towns and subdued 300 tribes, engaged with more than 3,000,000 men, swept over a million human beings from the earth, and took a million more prisoners to be sold into slavery. *' He was the first to lead an army into interior Gaul, the first to cross the Rhine into Ger- many, the first to bring a navy into the Western Ocean or to sail into the Atlantic with an army to make war.” He left a magnificent country for the Romans to appropriate and retain until their increas- ing corruption left it in turn an easy prey to the Germans. He inspired such terror of the Roman arms that the tide of barbarian invasion was stayed for centuries.
IV. Casar’s LATER CAREER.
** The foremost man of all this world." — Shahesfeare. “ Casar could bear no superior, Pompey no equal." — Lucan,
Meanwhile events had been moving on at Rome. With Crassus dead, Cesar and Pompey were left in the enjoyment of almost abso- lute authority. They had been friends from youth, but none the less rivals, and the death of Julia (B.C. 54) sundered the last ties that bound them together. In 52 Pompey had been made sole consul and found himself at the head of a party which, under cover of the constitution, was determined to destroy Cesar that it might retain the power which his reforms threatened to place in worthier hands.
Caesar's proconsulship of Gaul would expire at the end of B.c. 49. He wished to run for a second consulship in B.c. 48. The senate
xxii Introduction.
resolved to prevent this, and commanded him to resign his ofice and disband his army several months before the expiration of his term. If they could once get him to Rome as a private citizen without an army, they knew they could crush him. Cesar knew this too, and refused to obey the decree unless Pompey should also disband his troops. Pompey would have been willing t ee to this fair propo- sition, but his friends would not permit him, and were bent on destroying Casar. Naturally the charge of false play was made on both sides, and the strife continued until Caesar was finally declared a public enemy. He therefore crossed the Rubicon, a small stream which formed the boundary of his province and the limit of his authority, and began to march towards Rome. He took but a single legion with him and continued his efforts to come to an understanding with the Of£imates, having hopes of a compromise. He made a speech to his soldiers, explaining the situation, and was assured of their enthusiastic support. Labienus alone deserted him, corrupted, it is said, by Roman gold.
Caesar's march through Italy was like a triumphal procession ; the cities opened their gates to him and he was everywhere hailed with enthusiasm. Among the Opsimafes there was nothing but conster- nation and fear. They had pinned their faith to Pompey, who had boasted that he had but to stamp his foot on the ground and legions would spring from the earth ready to obey him. He had vastly over- rated himself (as was his wont), and had no conception of Cesar's power and genius. Cicero well sums up the situation in a letter to his friend Atticus : * The consuls are helpless. There has been no levy. With Casar pressing forward and our general doing nothing, the men will not come to be enrolled. Pompey is prostrate, without courage, without purpose, without force, without energy." Pompey had been looked upon by his partisans as almost divine. He had been peculiarly fortunate throughout his career and had made a great military reputation by assuming the laurels that others had won. Mommsen says of him: “He was radically a commonplace man, formed by nature to make a good corporal, but forced by circum- stances to be a general.” Now that he was confronted by a really serious difficulty and by a really able man, he was paralyzed.
Pompey with his forces and accompanied by the senators fled in
The Life of Caius Julius Casar. xxiii
a panic to Brundisium and sailed across the Adriatic to Epirus. Caesar meanwhile continued his victorious advance, and in sixty days was master of Italy. Then he went to Spain, and before autumn closed had met and defeated all opposition there. Returning to Rome he made preparations to follow Pompey. Many prominent Optimates had fallen into his hands, but he let them all go free, to their own great amazement and to Caesar's eternal praise. In a letter he says: *I will conquer after a new fashion and fortify myself in the possession of the power I acquire by generosity and mercy."
Casar followed Pompey across the sea from Brundisium, transport- ing his army in two divisions. He encountered considerable diffi- culty on account of storms and the lack of ships. After much skir- mishing, anxiety, and suffering (on Caesar's part), owing to scarcity of food and supplies, he fought a battle at Pharsalia in Thessaly on Aug. 9, B.C. 48. Before the battle Pompey's officers felt so sure of victory that a rich banquet was spread awaiting their return from the field. In numbers and equipment Pompey was much superior, and with him was all the wealth and respectability of Rome. He had 45,000 infantry and $000 cavalry against Caesar's 22,000 and 1000, respectively ; but he was overwhelmingly defeated and the battle ended in a terrible panic and great slaughter, in which 15,000 men lost their lives. As Casar viewed the slain he said sadly: * They would have it so. After all that I had done for my country, I, Gaius Casar, should have been condemned as a criminal if I had not appealed to my army."
Pompey fled for his life and took ship to Egypt and was there murdered by the king, who hoped thus to win Caesar's favor. When Casar arrived there, however, a few days later, and Pompey's head was presented to him, he is said to have turned away from the sight with horror and grief. He now overcame all remaining opposition in several short and brilliant campaigns. The first of these was in Asia Minor, where he conquered so easily that he reported it to the senate in the words that have since become famous: * Vest, vidi, vici." By the battle of Thapsus in Africa (B.c. 46) and that of Munda in Spain (B.C. 45), the Pompeian party was finally crushed.
Casar now returned to Rome, where he was made tmferator — possessing the entire imperium, or military dominion of Rome, not
xxiv Introduction.
of a single colony or province merely — and perpetual dictator (a%e- tator perpetuo), which offices clothed him with all the political authority of the state. By the powers thus conferred he laid the foundations of the Imperial constitution, which was afterwards (B.C. 30) set in operation by his grand-nephew and adopted son, Octavianus, later known as Augustus. This scheme of government eventually became (as was possibly foreseen from the start) an hereditary monarchy, under the name and form of a republic. Dur- ing the short period of Caesar's rule he continued the good work of his first consulship and carried a series of measures of wise and prac- tical statesmanship, such as the reform of the calendar, the regula- tion of the administrative system, and the policy of checks upon the abuses of the money power. He also planned extensive military expeditions against Parthia, Scythia, and Germany, and large public works and improvements, such as draining the Pomptine marshes and cutting through the isthmus of Corinth. With characteristic energy he accomplished much in a very short time.
But the possession of this exalted authority involved the utter over- throw of the constitution and necessarily excited alarm and jealousy among patriots and demagogues alike. Rumors were abroad that Casar was seeking to be king, a name detested at Rome since the foundation of the republic. His rivals were jealous, and not a few friends were disappointed at not having received as large favors as they thought they deserved. Many of his former enemies were bitter against him, because he had been magnanimous enough to forgive them. These feelings culminated in a conspiracy against his life. The leaders were Cassius, a violent and fearless man driven mad by jealousy and baffled ambition; and Marcus Brutus, who had no better friend than Cesar, but who fancied that he must emulate his ancestor, Brutus the first consul, who expelled the Tarquins. Cesar received many warnings of what was going on, but disregarded them all with his usual indifference to danger. The deed was consum- mated in the senate-house on the Ides of March, B.c. 44. The great dictator was struck down by false friends and fell, pierced with wounds, at the foot of Pompey's statue. This dastardly act received the condemnation it deserved, and few have dared to defend it on the ground.of patriotism. Those concerned in it all
The Life of Caius Julius Casar. xxv
died violent deaths soon after. Both Brutus and Cassius committed suicide, the latter stabbing himself with the very dagger which he had used against Cesar.’
V. PERSON AND CHARACTER OF CAESAR,
* Death makes no conquest of this conqueror For now he lives in fame, though not in life."— Shakespeare. “Great Julius, whom all the world admires.” — Milton.
Suetonius describes Cesar when a youth as tall, slight, and hand- some, with dark piercing eyes, a sallow complexion, large nose, lips full, features refined and intellectual, neck sinewy and thick. He adds further that he was neat to effeminacy about his dress and appearance. Fond of athletics, he excelled in all manly sports, especially in riding. In danger he knew no fear and often per- formed acts of great personal daring. His health was vigorous until his later years, and he could endure an apparently unlimited amount of labor and hardship. Added years gave him a majestic and com- manding presence without detracting from the grace and courtesy of his bearing. We judge him to have been a man of singular charm and of unusual personal magnetism.
Thanks to the peculiar skill possessed by the ancients in the art of portraiture, we have good reason to believe that we may see the great dictator as he was, from existing statues and busts. Two of the most noted of these are the busts in the British Museum (Fig. 47) and that in the Louvre (Fig. 1). The one in the Naples Museum (Fig. 78) is judged by competent critics to be conventional and not modelled.after the living man. Those first mentioned are thought to be true to life. The one in the British Museum shows us Cesar the statesman, the man of peace ; the one in the Louvre, Cesar the man of action, the martial hero.*
1 For a vivid imaginative account of the conspiracy, see Shakespeare's “ Julius Casar." 30n the portraits of Casar, see an illustrated article by Mr. John S. Ropes in
Scribner's Magasine for February, 1887, and S. Baring-Gould's “ Tragedy of the Cmn," Vol. I.
xxvi Introduction.
What Alexander was to the Greeks, and Hannibal to the Cartha- ginians, that and much more was Cesar to the Romans. The two former excelled all men of their times in war only ; but Cesar had such extraordinary abilities in widely different directions that many regard him as the most remarkable man that history records. In whatever he did, he always did the best possible. He had the great- est diversity of gifts ; as a student of language, he composed a treatise on grammar while crossing the Alps ; as an orator, Quintilian says he would have rivalled Cicero had he devoted his time to this art ; as a general, he has had nosuperior and hardly a peer ; and, above all, he was the greatest politician and statesman of his time. To his statecraft all his other acts are subordinate, and by this they should be interpreted.
Caesar was too great a man to be without enemies. He has been accused of being a traitor to his country, who by a deep-laid scheme overthrew its constitution. He was undoubtedly ambitious for power, and he used it in making such changes in the constitution as were sorely needed to keep it from going to pieces ; but how far the acts by which he accomplished this desirable end were the result of a plan to further his personal ambition, and how far they were com- pelled by the stress of circumstances, we cannot judge. "We do know, however, that he professed an earnest desire for peace, until he was driven into war by the hatred and perversity of his opponents. , He has also been accused of immorality, cruelty, and irreligion. It would be vain to maintain that Cesar was a model of virtue in an age that was notoriously and openly wicked and profligate. We know that Cesar was a man of perfect self-control, and that he was remarkable for extreme abstemiousness in eating and drinking. As for the rest, he was probably no worse than the average.
Doubtless he was cruel, judged by modern standards. He butch- ered without mercy thousands of defenceless men, women, and chil- dren. But we must remember that Cesar was a Roman, of a people naturally cruel and careless of bloodshed, and, again, that he was dealing with Gauls and Germans, whom the Romans despised, and for whom he had not, nor could have, any feelings of sympathy or kindness. The doctrine of human brotherhood is something he never heard of. But, on the other hand, contrast with this his constant care
The Life of Caius Julius Casar. xxvii
and anxiety for the welfare of his soldiers, his patience and forbear- ance with their mistakes, such as no modern commander has exhibited in his memoirs, and, above all, recall his mercy to his opponents in the Civil War, whom he freely pardoned and restored to honor and favor. Contrast Caesar's dictatorship with the horrors of Marius and Sulla, and we cannot wonder that his clemency became famous.
That Cesar was a skeptic is no doubt true. Theage was skeptical and the learned classes no longer believed in the gods of their fore- fathers. What Cesar’s real beliefs were, or if he had any, we do not know. He often speaks of fortune as ruling in the affairs of men, and probably had some vague and dimly defined belief in a supreme power.
VI. Casar’s LITERARY WORK.
As a man of letters Cesar is hardly less eminent. His vast and massive intellect could hold in its grasp a great variety of subjects. He wrote on many different themes, such as philosophy, language, astronomy, and divination. Of all his books only his Commentaries on the Gallic and Civil Wars have come down to us in complete form. They stand as the best military history that was ever written. Their ulterior purpose was to justify him in the eyes of the world for the course he took in opposing the senate and the government. He does this rarely by argument, but by such a tactful and master- ful collocation of facts that the unthinking reader feels himself per- suaded that Caesar could hardly have done otherwise.
The style of these memoirs is remarkable for directness, terseness, and simplicity. Cicero, one of the greatest masters of style, says of them, “I pronounce them indeed to be very commendable, for they are simple, straight-forward, agreeable, with all rhetorical ornament stripped from them as one strips off a garment.” While the lan- guage is lucid, it is packed full of meaning, and even a good Latinist needs to read slowly and with deliberation that the full thought of each sentence may be gathered. Sometimes a whole sentence is crammed into an adjective or a participle. To translate into good English requires, therefore, frequent amplification.
Like all great men, Caesar rarely speaks of himself. In his works he refers to himself in the third person and with such modesty and
xxviii Introduction.
impartiality that you would never suspect him to be the writer. Efe betrays his identity by three slips of the pen where he uses the first person. He never struts or poses for effect, not even when he is narrating sublime deeds of heroism.
Cesar wrote his Commentaries in the midst of intense activity. They were jotted down as he journeyed and fought; mere notes, as it were, for future amplification. Hirtius says, * While others . know how faultlessly they are written, I know with what ease and rapidity he dashed them off."
For us the Gallic War has a peculiar interest because it treats of the peoples with whom we are most familiar and from whom most of us derive our ancestry. It marks, in a sense, the beginning of modern history. Active, keen-sighted, and truthful, Casar gives us such insight into these nations as serves to explain many of their present political and social peculiarities.
VII. Important EVENTS IN CA&SAR’S LIFE.
B.C. 100 Bom, July 12th. * 83 Marries Cornelia, the Daughter of Cinna. * 80-78 Serves with the Army in Asia. «* 76-75 Studies Oratory at Rhodes. « 6 Questor. “ 65 ZEdile. “« 63 Pontifex Maximus. “ 62 Praetor. “« 61 Propretor in Spain. « 60 Forms the First Triumvirate. “« $9 Consul. * — 68-49 Proconsul in Gaul. " $6 Meeting of the Triumvirate at Luca. * — $0 The Trouble with Pompey begins. “ 49 Crosses the Rubicon. Civil War begun. « 48 The Battle of Pharsalia. « 46 The Battle of Thapsus. Declared Dictator for ten years. “ 45 The Battle of Munda. Appointed Imperator for life. “ 44 The Conspiracy. Assassinated in the Senate House on the Ides of March.
Roman Mihary Affairs. xxix
II. ROMAN MILITARY AFFAIRS.
L Tse ARMY AND ITS DIVISIONS.
3. The Legions, 4. The Engineers and Artisans. 2. The Cavairy. 5. The Artillery. 3. The Auxiliaries. 6. The Baggage Train.
7. The Officers and their Staff. IL THE STANDARDS. HL Tue Music.
IV. THE LEGIONARY.
a. Enlistment. d. Weapons. £g. Work. 4. Clothing. e. Baggage. b. Pay. c. Armor. J. Food. í. Discipline. V. THE CAMP. VL Tue MarRcH. VIL Tue BATTLE. VIIIL Tue SiEGE. IX. THe FLEET.
I. THE ARMY AND ITS DIVISIONS.
I. The Legions.
The Roman legion corresponded to a modern Division, but was more an organic whole, since it was the smallest unit that had sepa- rate line officers. What its normal strength was in Czsar’s time we have no means of knowing; but a probable estimate puts it at 5000 men. The actual effective strength in the field, however, was usually much less, falling to 3000 men, as at the battle of Pharsalia (on Cesar’s own authority). This variation in number was due to the many absences from duty which always occur in a military organiza- tion, and to the losses incurred by the individual legions in previous campaigns. Losses in old legions were not usually made good by new recruits, but the latter were formed into new legions; hence the older the legion, the smaller usually its enrollment. The average effective strength of the legion in the Gallic War was probably near 3600 men.
xxx Introduction.
The subdivisions of the legions were as follows:
I legion = 10 cohorts of about 360 men each. I cohort = 3 maniples of 120 men each. I maniple == 2 centuries of 60 men each.
There were, therefore, 10 cohorts, 30 maniples, and 60 centuries in each legion. These divisions did not, however, like our companies, have special “commissioned officers,” but were commanded by centu- rions who came from the ranks. The legions constituted the main body of the army and did most of the fighting, but there were other arms employed for various purposes (see below). The legions were designated by numbers, given in the order of their enlistment.
2. The Cavalry.
The cavalry (egustatus), originally of Roman citizens, was in Czsar’s time composed almost exclusively of recruits from subject or allied states. In Caesar's army it was composed of Gauls, Spaniards, and Germans. There was no fixed ratio between the number of legionaries and cavalry. In the campaign against the Helvetians, Casar had 4000 eqwifes, in the battle of Pharsalia, 1000; but the number of legions was the same in both.
The cavalry was divided into regiments (a/ae) of about 330 horse- | men each; these were subdivided into 10 squadrons (£wr»ae) of 33 horsemen each ; and these again into 3 squads (decuriae) of 11 each. See Figs. 12, 13.
3. The Auxiliaries.
The auxiliaries (auxtlia fedstum) were infantry forces from allied and subject states. Czsar nowhere gives the number of his axzz/za, and it was doubtless as various as that of his cavalry. They were the light-armed soldiers (mzlites levis armaturae), the archers (sagtt. tarii), and the slingers (/usdttores). See Figs. 30, 104, 105, 115. The best slingers came from the Balearic Islands, the best archers from Crete and Numidia. The light-armed soldiers wore no heavy armor and carried a light round shield (Sarma). The archers had neither corselet, helmet, nor shield. The latter they could not carry on account of their bows.
Roman Military Affairs. xxxi
Cesar placed little reliance on his avxs/sa for actual fighting, but used them for the most part to make a show of force and frighten the enemy (Bk. i. 51), and to assist in building fortifications. In engagements the bowmen and slingers were usually stationed on the wings (a/ae), and from this were called a/arss.
4. The Engineers and Artisans.
The engineers and artisans ( /abri) sometimes formed a separate corps under the command of a chief engineer ( fraefectus fabrum), and sometimes they were called from the ranks of the legions when their services were needed. Cesar had a chief engineer, but no special body of men (cf. Bk. v. 11). They were employed in build- ing bridges, ships, winter quarters, and in repairing weapons and equipments.
5. The Artillery.
Engines of war were not often used on the battlefield, where modern artillery forms such an important branch of the service, but mainly in the defence and assault of fortified cities or camps. They had a limited use also in the fleet (Bk. iv. 25).
We have no exact account of the construction of these engines. Casar almost always calls them /orsmena (cf. torquere, to twist), a name which clearly points to the elasticity of twisted rope, sinew, or hair, for the source of their energy. They were of three kinds: catapultae, ballistae, and scorpiones (see Figs. 61,75,95). The cata- pultae shot great arrows in a horizontal direction, like a cannon; the ballistae hurled great stones or heavy blocks of wood through the air in a high curve, as a mortar throws shells. The range of these weapons was from 1500 to 2000 ft. "A scorpio was a small catapult having a range of about 350 ft. It was an accurate and deadly weapon. Czesar tells of one at the siege of Avaricum that marked and killed man after man in the same spot (Bk. vii. 25). The tormenta were usually served and kept in repair by the _/aér1, but as Cesar had no such corps, they were probably in his army served by legionaries.
xxxii Introduction.
6. The Baggage Train.
The baggage of the army, except the packs corresponding to knapsacks which the soldiers themselves carried (sarcinae), was borne by horses and mules (tumenfa), and in wagons. The latter, however, were used mainly by the traders (mercatores) and sutlers (/ixae) that followed the legion. The baggage of each legion was by no means inconsiderable. It consisted of tents, blankets, tools, the /ormenta, provisions, etc., and required no less than 500 pack- animals to a legion. The inconvenience and delay occasioned by the care of so much baggage caused the Romans to call it ;»»fedi- menta (incumbrances), and a legion marching with its baggage was called /egio impedita ; when without, Jegio exfedifa. Along with the baggage train went a multitude of drivers, grooms, officers' servants, and other menials, all of whom are included in the general term calones. Most or all of these were slaves. See Figs. 14, 55.
7. The Officers and their Staff.
The superior officers were: (1) the commander-in-chief (smPerator or dux belit). He possessed the imperium or supreme military authority by virtue of his office, but by etiquette first received the name émperator from his soldiers after his first victory. In Cesar’s case it was bestowed after his victory over the Helvetii.
(2) The Zegati. These were men of senatorial rank (i.e. who had once held a curule magistracy). They were appointed by the senate or the people on the nomination of the proconsul. The senate also determined the number that a general should have; Cesar had ten. They often acted as ambassadors and made treaties, but their chief duties were military. Their powers were in no way independent, but derived from the general, who might put them in command of one or more legions or confer upon them the z»eriw»: in his absence (Zegatus pro praetore). In his battle with Ariovistus Cesar placed a Jegatws at the head of each of his legions (Bk. i. 53), thus giving them an independent command, a practice which he afterwards con- tinued to the great advantage of the service.
(3) The guaestores were officers elected by the people annually to administer the financial affairs of the provinces, one for each smperator.
Roman Military Affatrs. xxxiii They had charge of the military chest, and saw to the pay, clothing, shelter, and general equipment of the legions serving in their respec- tive provinces. On occasion they exercised the military authority of a legatus (Bk. i. 53); they were the ancient equivalent of a modern quartermaster. Besides these general officers, there were attached to each legion six £rióuni militum, who were probably originally in com- mand of the legion. They were divided into three pairs, each pair taking command in its turn. In Caesar's time they were no longer trained soldiers, but chiefly young men of equestrian rank, who went into the army for a year or two to get some military experience and thus begin their public career (cf. Bk. i. 39), so that ordinarily the legion had no proper commanding officers. Casar was not slow to see that these political and social favorites were not the men to lead his legions into battle, and he therefore introduced the lasting reform of transferring this duty to the Zegafi, as mentioned above (cf. Bk. ii. 20; v. 1, 25, 47). Thereafter the duties of the tribunes became mainly administrative and judicial; they cared for the levying, the discharge, and the equipment of the troops, and for the army supplies, under the orders of the guaestor,; and they pre- sided at courts-martial and took part in the councils of war. Some- times they led the legions on the march and received subordinate military commands (cf. Bk. vii. 47, 52).
Surrounding the superior officers there was always a large number of young men, forming a kind of staff, who acted as orderlies and body-guards. The only officers “of the line” were the tribunes, and, as appears above, their command was limited.
The real leaders of the men were the inferior (* non-commissioned ") oficers, the centurions. Corresponding to sergeants and corporals, these were always plebeians, often of the lowest birth, who were promoted from the ranks entirely on account of their fighting quali- ties, and could never rise higher. There were two centurions in each maniple, making six for each cohort and sixty for the legion. The six centurions of the first cohort outranked the others and were called centuriones primorum ordinum, and were the only ones that ordinarily sat with the superior officers in the council of war. The first cohort always contained the flower of the legion, and the men in the first century of this cohort excelled all the others. Their leader,
*
xxxiv Introduction.
the first centurion of the whole cohort (rimus or prims-pilus) and so of the whole legion, must needs be a man of great personal prowess and skill, an actual fighter, one to whom all could look as to a model soldier. Such was, for example, Publius Sextius Baculus, who repeatedly deserved the praise of his general (cf. Bk. ii. 25 ; iii. 5 ; vi. 38), and Titus Balventius (vir fortis etf magnae virtutis, Bk. v.
35). As a badge of his office the centurion carried a short staff (vitis), but he was armed much like the other soldiers (see
Fig. 40).
The chief distinction in dress between the officers and men was the red urtica militaris worn by the legates and tribunes, and the purple cloak (fa/udamentum) worn by the general (Bk. vii. 88). The officers wore also coats-of-mail of gilded bronze (see Fig. 86).
Between the centurions and common soldiers in rank were the speculatores, evocati, beneficiarii, aguiltfers or signiferi, and bucina- fores, tubicines, or cornicines. The sfeculatores or scouts obtained news of the enemy and carried despatches. The evocati were veterans who had completed their term of service, but remained in the army at the request of their commander. The deneficiari# were soldiers that had received some gift or privilege for meritorious service. The signiferi or agusisferé were the standard bearers: soldiers selected for their courage and fidelity. The ówcinatores and Zubicines were the musicians. All of these had rights and exemptions not enjoyed by the common soldiers. See Figs. 39, 84, 114.
II. THe STANDARDS.
The term signa is applied in a general sense to all the standards of the army. That of the legion was an eagle (aqszéa), usually of silver or bronze, about the size of a dove, on a wooden staff. It was sometimes carried by the chief centurion (frimipilus) of the legion. Sometimes it had below it a little red or white banner (vexillum), inscribed with the number or name of the legion. See
W Figs. 13, 121, 123.
In a narrower sense, signum was used for the standard of the cohort or the maniple. Each cohort had its own signum (Bk. ii. 21), and in earlier times each maniple, but probably not in Caesar's day.
Roman Military Affairs. XXXV
The cavalry and light-armed troops and all separate detachments carried only the vext/ium (Bk. vi. 36). The general's flag at head- quarters was also called vexi//um. It was a large white banner with an inscription in red, giving the name of the general and that of his army. A large red vertl/um displayed at headquarters was the signal for battle (Bk. ii. 20). See Fig. 7o.
III. THE Music.
The difficulty of carrying the voice through the din of battle early led the Romans to use the penetrating tones of brass instruments for giving orders. The four instruments used by them were the bugle (bucina), the trumpet (4sda), the cavalry trumpet (/i?uss), and the horn (corwx). See Figs. 36, 37, 38, 84.
The ówcína, whose shape and appearance are uncertain, sounded the changes of the night-watch and the reveille in the morning. The tuba, a straight trumpet of brass more than three feet long, with a bell- shaped mouth, gave the signal for attack or retreat, the signal being taken up and repeated by the cormw. The latter was a circular- shaped instrument which the performer often placed about his neck. The £ua had a deep tone ; the cornu a sharper one. The general's call to an assembly (conzio) was the classicum, sounded by all the üstruments at once.
IV. Tuk LEGIONARY.
a. Enlistment. — The legion was composed of Romans only. Citi- zens were liable to conscription between the ages of seventeen and forty-six. The recruit must be of sound health and of suitable height. The Romans, as a rule, were rather undersized. Cesar expressly Mentions the small stature of his troops as compared with that of the Germans (Bk. i. 39; ii. 30) ; but the Romans had learned the lsson of civilization, — that victories are gained not by huge bones and big bodies, but by trained skill and scientific tactics. Man for man, the Germans were doubtless more than a match for the Romans ; but against the organized and disciplined legion — the most effective machine for battle that the world had yet seen — they were almost
xxxvi Introduction.
powerless. The term of service was twenty years, and after this the veteran was discharged with enough to provide for his old age. Often he reénlisted for farther service (evocatus).
b. Clothing. — All the legionaries were clothed alike. Next the skin was a nearly or quite sleeveless woollen shirt (¢s##ca), reaching nearly to the knees ; over this a leathern coat strengthened by bands of metal across the breast, back, and shoulders (Zorica). In cold or wet weather the soldier wore about him a wide woollen mantle (sagum), which was fastened by a clasp (/i5u/a) on the right shoul- der, leaving the right arm free. At night the sagum served as a blanket. About his waist was a leather belt (cingulum militiae), bound with metal and with strips of metal hanging from the front as a protection to the lower part of the body. His feet were covered with strong half-boots (ca/igae). This might be called his undress uniform. See Figs. 107, 115, 126, etc.
c. Armor. — The defensive armor consisted of a coat-of-mail (Jorica, described above), a helmet, and a shield. The helmet (ga/ea or cassts), of iron or of leather strengthened with brass, was open in front and adorned with a white crest, which was one of the t#sig- "ia put on at the beginning of a battle (Bk. ii. 21). See Fig. 87, etc. The shield (scuéum) was rectangular, about four feet long and two feet wide; it was made of wood slightly curved, and covered with linen and heavyleather. About the rim it was bound with metal, and also in the centre. There was a single handle on the inside and oppo- site it on the outside a boss or knob (#40) of metal, to divert mis- siles and to strengthen the whole. A common device on the outside was a winged thunderbolt. See Figs. 116, 117, etc.
d. Weafons. — The weapons of offence were the sword and spear. The sword (gladius Hispanus) was about two feet long, straight and two-edged. It was used more for thrusting than for striking, and was not usually hung from the body-belt, but from a belt passing over the left shoulder to the right hip (2a/ews). See Figs. 17, 115, etc.
The spear ($z/w») of Caesar's soldiers was between six and seven feet long. The shaft was of wood and about four feet long. Into this was fitted the slender iron shank that ended in a barbed head. From monuments and from remains that have been found in vari- ous places, the weight is estimated at about three pounds and the
Roman Military Affairs. xxxvii
hurling distance about 100 feet. Each legionary had one of these weapons. See Figs. 15, 107.
€. Baggage (Packs). — Besides his arms and armor, the legionary carried tools for digging, cooking utensils (vasa), food for at least two weeks (ci2ariía), his cloak or blanket (sagum), and usually one or two stakes (va//s) for the rampart of the camp. The weight of the whole was about sixty pounds. For convenience in carrying, the vasa, cibaria, and other small articles were tied in a compact bundle to the end of a forked stick and carried over the shoulder. During a halt this rested on the ground and the soldier could lean on it for support. Upon a sudden call to battle he could quickly lay it down and be ready (exfedifws) for the fray. The forked sticks were named Marius’s mules (#u/i Mariani), after the great Marius who introduced their use. The collective personal baggage of the legion- ary was called his savcina (see Figs. 14, 115).
f. Food. — The food provided for the legionary was coarse flour or unground wheat or barley. This he must grind for himself. The ration of food for one day was about two pounds. Every fifteen days he received two mods, — about two pecks. This monotonous diet was varied occasionally by meat and such food as he could find by foraging ; and there was always the chance of bartering his ra- tions for the greater variety carried by the traders (mercatores), who followed the army in large numbers and did a thriving business with the soldiers.
g. Work. — It has been truthfully said that Cesar conquered Gaul as much with the spade and shovel as with the sword and spear. The legionary was above all a skilful digger, and besides the actual fight- ing, no small part of his labor was the almost daily task of fortifying the camp (castra munire). At least three hours were needed for this work. After this there were the watches to keep, the arms to bumish, and all the other busy routine of camp life.
h. Pay. — Cesar paid his legionaries 1234 cents a day or about $45 a year. This was nearly the same amount that a day laborer could earn at Rome. The soldier was better off than the laborer merely by his shelter and by the certainty of employment. A deduc- tion from the pay was made for food and equipments furnished by the state. Food, however, was very cheap, and a soldier in active
xxxviii Introduction.
service could always expect a considerable increase in his income from booty and from the gifts of his general.
i. Discipline. — The martial spirit of the soldiers and their atten- tion to duty were maintained and increased by appropriate rewards and punishments. Among the latter the most usual were withholding of wages, degradation in rank, corporal punishment, dismissal from the service, and, in cases of flagrant offences, death. A minor offence committed by a company of soldiers was punished by putting them on barley rations and giving them extra work on the fortifications. Among rewards may be mentioned public praise in the presence of the army, promotion in rank, increase in wages, or the presentation of a crown of leaves or grasses, which corresponded to the bestowal of a modern military decoration.
V. THE CAMP.
The success of Roman arms in hostile and barbarous countries was largely due to the custom of guarding against surprise by making fortified camps. The summer camp (casfra aestiva) and the winter camp (castra hiberna) seem to have been alike in all essential features. In the latter, however, more provision was made for the comfort and convenience of the men. Instead of tents, huts of tim- ber and earth, thatched with straw or covered with hides, were pro- vided for them. The camp was regularly in the form of a square, often with rounded corners, but the lay of the land necessitated many variations from the regular plan (see Fig. 119). Of all the camps of Caesar that have been discovered, but one, that on the Aisne (Bk. ii. 5), approaches a square form. The site was chosen with great care, and was always on high ground and near wood and water. An ideal spot was the slope of a hill with some kind of natural defence on the sides and rear, and with sufficient ground in front for the array of thelegions. Such a position would give the Romans an opportunity for their favorite onslaught e supertore loco (cf. Bk. ii. 8; Bk. v. 5o).
A small force of soldiers under centurions was sent ahead to select the site for the camp and stake it out. Two bisecting lines were drawn at right angles to each other to mark the four gates (see Fig. I19): the porta practoria, facing the enemy; the forta decumana,
Roman Military Affairs. xxxix
in the rear; the foria principalis dextra, on the right side; the porta principalis sinistra, on the left. Between the gates on the right and left ran a broad street, the via principalts. The forward half of the camp was allotted to the soldiers, the rear half to the Officers and their attendants. All about the inside of the fortifica- tions ran a broad space, at least one hundred feet wide, left vacant for baggage, evolutions of troops, and to protect the tents within from missiles that the enemy might hurl over the walls. Near the middle of the camp was an open square ( fraetorium), in which stood the general's, tent (¢abernaculum ducis). Before this was the altar on which he sacrificed, and on the left was a sodded mound of earth (tribunal or swggestus; cf. Bk. vi. 3), from which he pronounced judgment and addressed the assembled soldiers. The full details of the interior arrangement of Caesar's camp are not known; but every officer, every cohort, every maniple, every man had his appointed place.
No night passed that the army was not housed in such a camp, fortified by wall and ditch. As soon as the soldiers arrive at the spot marked out for them, laying aside helmet, shield, and spear, they begin to dig the ditch (fossa), the earth from which is used in con- structing the wall (va//u»t). If time permits, the sides of the em- bankment are covered with sods to hold the earth, or with bundles of brush (fascfnes). The ditch was usually nine feet wide and seven feet deep, the wall six to ten feet high, and wide enough on the top to afford good standing room for a soldier in action. An ordinary camp for a night's sojourn could be fortified in about three hours. If the camp was intended for more than one night (casfra stativa), the fortifications were made stronger. The earth was made firmer by imbedding in it several lines of fascines parallel to the length; and on its top was set a breastwork of stakes (valli or sudes; cf. Bk. v. 40; Bk. vii. 72). This breastwork was about four feet high (see Fig. 118). Often wooden towers were erected on the walls (cf. Bk. v. 40; Bk. vii. 72), connected by galleries ( foz/es). The wall was made easy of access on the inner side by steps of brush. Sometimes small redoubts (casfe//a) were built at a distance from the main camp. These were made on the same general plan.
After the camp had been fortified and the leathern tents (sentoria, feles) put up in their assigned places, guards were set at the gates, and the regular routine of camp life began.
xl Introduction.
VI. THe Marca.
When the trumpet gave the signal (signum profectionts) to break up camp (castra movere), the soldiers struck their tents and packed their baggage (vasa conligere) ; at the second signal the baggage (tmpedimenta) was put on the pack-animals and in the wagons ; at the third signal the army (agmen) began its march. The start was made usually at sunrise, but it might be made earlier on special occasion. The ordinary day's march lasted about seven hours, and covered about 15 miles; a forced march (magnum iter) about 25. Casar made many such, his men travelling immense distances with incredible swiftness.
When marching in the enemy's country, the main body of troops (agmen) protected itself by a vanguard (agmen primum) of cavalry, light-armed infantry, and scouts (¢zp/oratores), and by a rear guard (agmen novissimum). Sometimes individual spies (speculatores) were sent far in advance to reconnoitre the country and the move- ments of the enemy’s forces.
The order of march of the main body depended on the nearness of the enemy. When no enemy was near, each legion marched in a single column and was followed by its baggage train (fee Bk. ii. 17). In the neighborhood of the enemy, a single column of troops in fighting trim (exfediff), ie. without packs (sarcinac), followed directly after the vanguard ; then came the baggage of the whole army, while the remaining forces acted as a rear guard (cf. Bk. ii. 19). Sometimes, for additional security against flank attacks, columns of infantry marched on each side of the baggage train, forming a hollow square (agmen quadratum ; see Fig.73). If, when marching in this order, the army was compelled to halt and defend itself, the soldiers, by facing about, presented to the foe a complete circle (o7dis) of armed men. When the foe was near and the ground level and open, the march was sometimes made in three parallel columns, which, by a simple evolution, could be quickly changed to the triple battle line (actes triplex), the regular formation for an engagement.
Streams were crossed either by fords or bridges. Romans could cross deeper fords than we, for they had no powder to keep dry
Roman Military Affairs. xli
(cf. Bk. v. 18). Sometimes a line of cavalry was sent across the stream to break the force of the current (cf. Bk. vii. 56). Bridges - were usually very simple affairs of logs covered with earth and brush, or of boats, but Caesar's masterpiece of military engineering was his roadway forty feet wide with which he twice spanned the Rhine (Bk. iv. 17; Bk. vi. 9; see Figs. 59, 8o).
VII. THE BATTLE.
As has been said (V), the camp was so chosen that the ground in front of it would be suitable for battle. The usual order of battle was triplex acies. The first line of the legion was formed of four cohorts and each of the others of three. In each cohort the three maniples stood side by side, and in each maniple the two centuries stood one behind the other, varying in formation according to the depth of the line. As to the distance between the lines we have no definite information ; nor even as to whether spaces were left between the cohorts. There were probably spaces between the different legions - and doubtless between the centre (#edia acies), where the legionaries stood, and the wings (cormua), composed of auxiliaries and cavalry. Czsar's lines were probably eight men deep. That would give each legion, estimated at 3600 men, a front of 180 legionaries, 45 for each cohort. When standing in open order for fighting, giving to each man the space necessary for the free use of his weapons, the front of each legion covered probably about 1000 feet, supposing the cohorts to stand close together; all this, however, is very uncertain.
When an attacking enemy had reached the right distance, the bugle sounded the charge, and the legions rushed forward, sword in sheath, and the front ranks with spears uplifted ready to hurl. When within range, the spears were thrown in a shower, the swords drawn, and a fierce charge made upon the mass of the foe, more or less disordered by the volley of spears. Along the front of the cohort rages a series of combats. The rear ranks press forward, throw their spears over the heads of their comrades, and take their places as the latter are wounded or weary. When the first line of cohorts has done its best, it makes room for the second line, re-forms, and gets breath for a new onset. Thus the battle goes on with the two
xlii Introduction.
lines in almost constant motion. The enemy are given no rest and are worn out by the repeated charges of the cohorts. The third line, however, is held in reserve, and is brought into action only in case the other two prove insufficient.
The cavalry in the rear, or on the wings, stand ready when the enemy break and flee to ride down the fugitives and cut them to pieces.
There were times when troops had to be arranged in special forma- tions. The most important of these were the cuneus, or wedge, the testudo, or tortoise, and the ordss, or circle. The first was an attack in column instead of in line, and was of use in cutting through and dividing an opposing battle line. "The second, in which the shields overlapped above like shingles on a roof, was used especially in approaching and storming walls, or whenever the enemy were to be driven from a higher position (cf. Bk. ii. 6; see Fig. 68). The last formation was like a modern hollow square with officers in the centre —except that from the character of ancient fighting it was rather circular than rectangular. It was necessary when the attack came from all sides at once (see Bk. iv. 37).
. VIII. THE SIEGE.
The Romans excelled in the art of taking walled cities, and this skill gave them an immense advantage in their warfare with semi- barbarous and ignorant peoples. There were three methods of doing this: first, by an immediate attack (ofpugnatio repentina); second, by an active siege, brought to a close by an assault (exfswg- natio) ; third, by investment and blockade (odstaio).
If there seemed to be a chance of success, a city was stormed at once with no formal preparation (ex ifimere). Its defenders were driven from the walls by a shower of missiles (Bk. iii. 25) ; the moat was filled with brush and earth ; the assaulters with shields locked in a festudo attempted to break open the gates or scale the walls with ladders.
If this method proved unsuccessful or impossible, a regular siege was begun. The work of a regular siege centred about the mound or agger, and to its construction everything else was subordinated.
Roman Military Affairs. xliii
It was begun at a distance from the wall, very nearly out of reach of the missiles of the enemy. It was then gradually extended in the direction of the point to be attacked, and was at the same time gradually increased in height until on a level with the top of the wall, or even higher. At Avaricum the mound was 80 feet high (Bk. vii 23-28). Its width was possibly 40 or 50 feet. It was made of earth and timber, and had connected galleries running through its various stories, through which the soldiers could move under cover (see Fig. 120). The men engaged in constructing the agger had to be protected from the enemy. Those who were building worked behind lines of $/wfei (see Figs. 130, 131), large standing shields, which were moved forward from time to time as the agger progressed. Those bringing material for the builders walked under rows of sheds called vineae (see Figs. 33, 120), extending the length of the agger. The workmen were protected also by archers and slingers and by engines of war (¢ormenia) standing behind lines of $/uwfei or upon movable towers (fwrres). The latter stood on the agger or on tither side of it, and advanced with it, and as they advanced increased in height story by story. As the workmen get nearer the wall the Piufei will no longer protect them. Then they find refuge under srong sheds of wood called /es/sdimes or musculi, placed at the ends of lines of vineae.
When the mound has reached the wall, a breach is made through it for the final assault (expugnatio). Sometimes this was accom- pished by undermining the wall, or it was pulled down from the top with huge iron hooks (falces murales). But the most common and most effective means was the battering ram (arses), a huge swinging beam from 60 to 100 feet long with a heavy mass of metal at one end, often shaped like a ram's head. This under a /es/wdo, or in the lowest story of a tower, was brought with tremendous force against the opposing masonry. When the final assault was made, soldiers rushed in from every quarter, over the mound, through the breach, and from the movable towers, from whose highest stories draw- bridges stretched to the walls.
Against these forms of assault the inhabitants used such means of tesitance as they could. The most effective were masses of stone, thrown from the wall upon the works, and fire. To guard against
xliv Introduction.
the latter, the besiegers had to cover all exposed woodwork with green hides. Battering rams and mural hooks were caught in slings and held fast, or drawn into the city, and mines were met by countermines, See Figs. 92, 93, 127.
When the location of the place was such that it could not be taken by such a siege as that described above, it was invested on every side (oósidio) and the inhabitants starved into submission. Among sieges of this kind were those of Gergovia (Bk. vii. 44-53) and Alesia (Bk. vii. 72-80), of which the last was one of the most remarkable of ancient times ; see Figs. 97, 102.
IX. THE FLkEET.
Casar mentions two principal classes of ships: saves Jomgae, or war galleys, and saves onerariae, or freight and transport vessels. - As compared with the former, the latter were shorter, broader, and deeper ; hence could carry greater burdens and were more seaworthy. They depended mainly on their sails, but often had rowers in addi- tion. The saves actuartae of Bk. v. 1 were a special class of transport vessel, with both sails and oars. Casar used them to carry troops, horses, and munitions of war to Britain. See Figs. 48, 51, 52.
The war galley was long, low, and narrow ; armed at the prow with a sharp beam (rostrum) shod with bronze, for ramming the enemy’s ships ; and propelled by one or two sails and a large force of rowers. The seamen (#aufae) attended to the steering and the managing of the sails, and were freemen. The rowers (remiges) were usually slaves. Galleys in Casar's time mostly had three banks of oars. , The steering apparatus was two broad-bladed oars near the stern, one on each side. The speed of these vessels was remarkable, almost equalling that of a modern steamship.
The fighting men were the legionaries embarked for the purpose. In fact, there was no distinct naval service, as with us. A fleet was simply an army afloat, and was commanded by military officers. Before going into action sormenta were placed on the deck, and also a turris , the mast was taken down and the sails and tackle housed. See Fig. 62.
Gaul and the Gauls. xlv
III. GAUL AND THE GAULS.
I. THE GALLIC PROVINCE.
THE district upon whose government Csesar entered in the spring of B.C. §8 consisted primarily of the two Gallic provinces, Cisalpine and Transalpine. Cisalpine Gaul was the northern portion of Italy, which several centuries earlier had been occupied by invaders from Gaul proper, and was not yet reckoned politically as a part of Italy; it was a wealthy, populous, and orderly country, the proconsul’s main dependence for troops and supplies, and his regular winter residence. Transalpine or Narbonnese Gaul received its name from its capital, the Roman colony Narbo. It contained some thriving cities and peaceful districts; but as a whole it had been but recently brought under the authority of Rome, and was still essentially a foreign coun- try. It comprised the whole coast of the Mediterranean from the Pyrenees to the Alps, having for its northern boundary an irregular and uncertain line, which separated the territory of the conquered nations of Gaul from the states which were still free. To these two provinces was added also Illyricum, which was a source of strength, but did not receive much of his attention.
The authority of the governor over his province was that of a military commander, whose power was not limited by the laws which protected the citizens of Rome. A few privileged cities or nations, such as the old Greek city Massilia, were wholly exempted from his authority ; but all other parts of the province, including Roman colo- nies like Narbo, were liable to tribute and under the jurisdiction of the governor, though the rights of Roman citizens were secured to them. A consular army consisted regularly of two legions; to these were added auxiliaries, both foot and horse, but the governor had power to levy new legions as he required them. Thus we find that Casar had six legions in his campaign against the Nervii.
* The free territories adjoining a Roman province were in no respect under the authority of the governor; but they were regarded as a legitimate field for his ambition, if there was any excuse for war, and
xlvi Introduction.
of such excuses there was usually no lack. The Roman policy was to enter into friendly relations with one of the parties or tribes in the free territory, load this with favors and privileges, and make use of it to overcome its rivals; in Gaul the Haedui, attached to Rome through some local rivalries, very well served this purpose.
Czsar’s province, at its western extremity, reached to Spain, a country which had belonged to the empire for more than a hundred and fifty years. To the north lay four great nationalities, with all of which he was ultimately brought in contact. These were the Gauls proper, the Belgians, the Germans, and the Britons.
Free Gaul (Libera Gallia) at that time consisted of all the un- subdued territory between the Pyrenees and the ocean on the one side, and the Rhine and the Alps on the other, thus comprising, in general, modern France and Belgium, with parts of Holland, Ger- many, and Switzerland. The central portion of this territory, fully a half of it in extent and population, was occupied by the Gauls proper, or, as they called themselves, Celts, no doubt originally the same word. Southwest of these were the Aquitani, a separate people of Iberian race, cognate to the Spanish; of these, the Basques of the present day are the representatives. To the northeast lived the Belgians, whose ethnic affinities are much disputed ; all that can be considered certain is that they were largely mixed with Germans. The Belgians occupied more territory than is now known as Belgium, including a considerable part of Holland on the one hand, and the northern belt of France on the other.
2. THE GALLic PEOPLE.
a. Origin and Early History. — The Gauls were a branch of the great nations of the Indo-European family that in prehistoric times occupied parts of Asia and the greater part of Europe. They were known to the ancients as Celts or Gauls, and this name was applied without discrimination to all the barbarous peoples of the unknown west of Europe. The term was rather geographical than racial. The Romans, though they had been brought into contact with the bar: barians of the north by war and commerce for many centuries, made no distinction, before Caesar's time, between German and Gaul.
Gaul and the Gauls. xlvii
The Pheenicians, those pioneer traders and intrepid sailors of antiq. uity, had had commercial dealings with the Gauls at a very remote period. Several centuries later, but still at an early date (about B.c. 600), the Greeks had made a settlement near the mouth of the Rhone, which afterwards grew into the prosperous city of Massilia (Marseilles), and opened up some trade routes into the interior. Both Phonicians and Greeks found the most powerful part of the Celts already well established in western Europe, and showing evidence of previous ‘possession for a period going back of any assignable date.
The Celts had been for centuries a migratory and always a warlike people. These characteristics led them into many countries where they made settlements of more or less importance. Besides those who occupied Gaul proper, there were Iberian Celts (Celtiberi) in Spain, British Celts, Belgic Celts, Italian Celts in northern Italy, Celts in the Alps (notably the Helvetii), Illyrian Celts, and Asiatic Celts, who had settled in Asia Minor and were known as Galatians. It was to them, after they were Christianized, that Paul wrote his wel-known epistle.
What knowledge the Greeks and Romans had of this powerful nation of barbarians was extremely vague. They had long hung like 3 dark storm-cloud on the northern frontier of both countries, and at intervals poured forth in overwhelming and destructive numbers. Once they spread desolation and dismay through Greece, and all but succeeded in plundering the rich temple of Delphi. In B.c. 390 Rome was destroyed by these same barbarians, and in B.C. 102 it was only the military genius of C. Marius that spared Italy a similar Visitation.
Long before the time of Casar, the Romans had succeeded in sub- duing the Gauls south of the Alps, making the prosperous and orderly Province of Cisalpine Gaul, as related above. Transalpine Gaul and llyricum were more recent additions to the empire, and were less thoroughly subdued and civilized. They had been finally conquered byQ. Fabius Allobrogicus. All to the north had as yet been un- explored and uninvaded by Roman arms. The Gauls, according to circumstances and location, showed at this time various degrees of Civilization. Those to the south and west, being nearer to the refine- ment of the province, had made rapid strides, had built many
xlviii Introduction.
flourishing cities, enjoyed prosperous and on the whole peaceful com- munity life, and practised the arts and commerce. But those farther removed in the east and north, and the Britons, were still in a semi- savage condition. Czesar’s expeditions among these are somewhat like similar military expeditions that nations are sending in our day to explore and subdue unknown Africa; and the trading posts established among them by the enterprising Greek merchants of Massilia, like the business ventures formerly sent among the Indians. .
à. Character and Customs. — The Gauls are described as tall and of great physical strength, with a fair skin and blonde hair, which they often reddened by artificial means. Men of rank and of author- ity wore the hair and beard long. The more barbarous tribes gave themselves a terrible aspect by painting hideous devices on their half- naked bodies. Their voices were rough and harsh, their words few, and their language obscure and figurative. Disparaging others, boastful of themselves, arrogant, fond of idleness, they were very quarrelsome and always ready to fight, to relieve the monotony of their existence, if for no other reason. "They were, however, high- spirited and brave to utter recklessness and contempt for death.
The Gallic women are described by an ancient writer as the most beautiful of all barbarian women and as thrifty housewives. He adds that, aided by his wife, who is much more formidable than he, the Gaul will hold his own in any conflict The Roman invaders were often witnesses of the heroism of these veritable Amazons.
The Gauls lacked stability of character, and are often criticized by Casar for their fickleness ; they were also very avaricious and given to superstitions. On the other hand, they were not vicious, but naturally of a simple and teachable disposition. They were very quick to learn and adopt whatever useful arts their neighbors brought to them. Their love of freedom was passionate ; but their long years of wandering had not developed in them that feeling of national unity and that love of the soil that we include under the term patriotism.
The life of the less civilized tribes was rude in the extreme. Their houses were little more than huts of clay and wood, thatched with straw and branches. The dwelling was open to daylight by the door
Gaul and the Gauls. xlix
alone, and had little or no furniture. Their beds were heaps of straw or furs. War was their principal occupation. They gave - some attention to agriculture, raising the coarser grains, the better sort of fruits and vegetables being unknown to them. They also had large flocks and herds. They ate but little bread, but large quantities of meat, which they are described as cutting with their swords and eating in a ravenous inanner.
The Gauls knew something of the arts and sciences. They did some weaving, and those on the coast had skill in shipbuilding and in navigation, and the Aquitanians were skilful miners. Their attempts at art were mainly imitations of what other lands brought to them. For example, they made more or less successful attempts to imitate the artistic coins of the Greeks and Romans. Several illustrations of Gallic coins may be found in the text (see Figs. 29, 64, 66, 81, etc, etc.). Cesar was the first to bring to the world authentic infor- mation about most of these matters, and the student is referred for farther interesting details to his narrative (see especially Bk. vi).
c. Dress. — The details of Gallic dress are not fully known. Like most semi-civilized or savage people, they were very fond of bright colors and finery. They wore much jewelry —both men and women —of gold, if they could afford it, otherwise of bronze. Especially characteristic was the heavy collar of twisted gold (/orguis, see Fig. 77) worn about the neck. The principal garments were a short, bright-colored tunic, either with or without sleeves, confined by a girdle of silver or gold, and trousers (&racae). Over the shoulders was worn a short cloak (sagum) often of fine material and of gor- geous color. The character of the costume depended upon the rank and wealth of the wearer. The feet were protected by shoes or by soles of wood strapped on with leathern thongs. See Fig. 28.
d. Arms and Military Tactics. — As has been said, a Gaul’s chief business was war. He was always a soldier and, whether in youth or in old age, hastened to war with the same ardor. His principal weapon was a long two-edged sword, hanging from an iron or steel chain at the right side. It was adapted for striking and cutting, but not so much for thrusting, and was but poorly tempered. This in itself gave the Romans a great advantage through the supe- tiority of their arms. The Gallic bronze sword came into use later,
| Introduction.
and was a much better weapon. In Czsar's time the iron sword probably still predominated. They had also various kinds of pikes, lances, and javelins, some made with peculiar waving and twisted blades to cause an uglier wound. Many weapons are mentioned with special names, but they are not capable of identification. Bows and slings, too, were used by them.
Ordinarily the Gaul wore no defensive armor. In fact, the common soldier went into battle with body almost bare. But the principal warriors wore chain mail (see Fig. 86), which is said to be a Gallic invention. At first this was made of iron. Later, better and lighter suits were made of bronze, and were sometimes adorned with silver and gold. The usual means for defence were the helmet and the shield. Shields were of various shapes and sizes and were adorned with figures of animals, etc., to suit the caprice or wealth of the owner, but the designs were of ancient origin. The helmets were surmounted with great horns, forms of birds or beasts, etc., designed to terrify the enemy (see Fig. 11). These also were, no doubt, survivals of earlier barbarism.
In battle they placed much reliance on their cavalry and in Northern Gaul and Britain on their war chariots. The infantry was arranged in great masses of men in close order, like the old Greek phalanx, with a line of shields before and on the sides, and sometimes with a roof of shields overhead, something like the sestudo formation of the Romans. When they had drawn near, champions were accus- tomed to leave the ranks, and, brandishing their arms, challenge the foe to single combat. The first onset of the Gallic phalanx was terrific and often swept everything before it; but if that could be withstood, the advantage lay with the open and pliable order of the legion. In the latter every soldier was called into action, but in the former the great bulk of the Gallic warriors was practically imprisoned in the mass, and only those on the outside could use their arms.
e. Government. — The Gauls were not a single nation, but a group of nations or tribes, about sixty in number, united by a very slight bond of consanguinity and common religion. "These tribes, which may be loosely compared to those of the North American Indians, though most of them were at a very much higher degree of civiliza-
tion, varied greatly in extent and power, the smaller ones often main-
Gaul and the Gauls. li
taining only a nominal independence under the protection of some larger one. They were for the most part ruled by a turbulent and oppressive aristocracy, sometimes with an elected chief magistrate. But sometimes an ambitious leader, like Orgetorix, succeeded in establishing for a time a kingly power. Thus the several states were torn by hostile parties, and were at the same time grouped into national factions, under the lead of the more powerful states. At the time of Casar, royalty had been almost abolished, and yearly magistrates (vergobrets) were elected instead. Every year represen- tatives from the different states met in assembly, and questions of national policy were discussed. Owing to the violent and excitable natures of the Gauls, these assemblies often ended in tumultuous scenes of disorder.
At the commencement of war, a call to arms was sounded, to which old and young responded. The last man to appear was put to death with tortures in the presence of the assembled people.
f. Religion. — The Druids. — Cesar says that the Gauls were devoted to religious matters. They were under the control of a class of priests known as Druids, who acted not only as priests, but also as arbiters and judges. By them was treasured the religious and philo- sophic lore of the Gauls, and to them the Gallic youth went for instruction, some of them remaining in training as long as twenty years. One of their most important doctrines was that of the trans- migration of souls. Belief in immortality gave the Gauls a contempt for death which enabled them to face the greatest dangers without ftinching.
The Druids gave their instructions and performed their bloody sacrifices in the depths of the forest. The oak and the mistletoe were sacred in their eyes. The mysterious rites of their worship are not well known, but many cruel and horrible practices are attributed to them by ancient writers, among them human sacrifices. Czsar mentions these, but did not know of their actual occurrence from per- sonal observation.
The principal religious observances of the Gauls were gradually abolished under Roman rule, but many of them were ‘baptized’ into Christianity and survive to-day in various modified forms as a part of the popular religion.
lii —— Introduction.
The strange monuments of stone found in many lands, called ‘cromlechs’ and * menhirs,’ popularly supposed to be Druidic monu- ments, are far older than the Druids and have nothing to do with their religion. |
Cesar gives the first authentic information about the Druids in his narrative (Bk. vi. 13-16).
3. SUBSEQUENT History or GAUL.
Casar left Gaul subdued and open to Roman occupation and greed. The country was rapidly colonized and civilized. Augustus divided it into four provinces and established the Roman authority on a firm basis. Only one great patriotic uprising occurred after Caesar's time, though the Gauls took part in the contests later for the imperial throne. In course of time the very language of Gaul became Latin, and this became the parent of modern French. In the fifth century tribes of Germans began to make inroads on the Roman domain, and the Franks, under Clovis as king, firmly estab- lished themselves in the north. Their power spread ; they subjugated the inhabitants, and gave their name to the country, which it bears to this day, — France, the lands of the Franks. There were many social and political changes after this time, but the same life flowed on from Roman Gaul to modern France. The French still display many of the characteristics of the ancient Gauls; they live in sub- stantially the same limits; many of their mountains, cities, and streams still bear the old names.
IV. THE BRITONS.
WiTH Casar begins the history of England. He found there a Celtic people, differing but little from those on the continent, save that they were more barbarous. What the condition or history of the British Isles was before Casar's invasion is wrapped in obscurity. A few Greek writers refer vaguely to them, and there was an equally vague knowledge of the smaller islands lying near. Even Caesar
The Germans. liti
gained but little detailed and accurate knowledge of the country, and after him the Romans did not go there for nearly one hundred years. Subsequently it was subdued and brought under Roman dominion. England still shows many traces of the Roman occupation. Many of her cities were founded by the Romans and bear Roman names. After the Romans came the northern invaders, who drove out or destroyed most of the original Celtic population. Those that survived are represented to-day by the Irish, the Welsh, and the Highland Scotch, among whom a branch of the Celtic language is still spoken to a considerable extent.
V.
THE GERMANS.
THE Germans first appear in history in the campaigns of the Cimbri and Teutones (B.C. 113-101), the latter of whom were undoubtedly of Germanic origin. The Romans obtained their first considerable knowledge of the country from Casar. The ancient limits assigned to it were less on the west and south, but indefinitely greater on the east and north, than the modern. In those directions it was ferra incognita to the Romans, and always remained so They never did more than subdue the border tribes along the Rhine and Danube. Cesar had relatively little to do with the Germans, but made such investigations as he could, the results of which are succinctly given in his narrative (Bk. iv. 1-3; Bk. vi. 21—28). The next account, in greater detail was given by Tacitus in his “Germania,” who corroborates Cesar in all important particulars.
The Germans were much less civilized than most of the Gauls. They were just at the end of the nomadic stage, and were settling down and beginning community life. Their last onward nomadic movement was that under Ariovistus, which it was Czsar’s fortune to arrest (Bk. i. 31-54). They were a more manly and vigorous race than the Gauls, warlike, independent, and virtuous. The country is described as a dismal land, covered for the most part with forests and swamps, producing little food, and subject to almost constant winter.
liv Introduction.
VI.
THE CAMPAIGNS IN GAUL.
THE campaigns of Czsar in Gaul lasted through eight seasons (B.c. 58-51), and are told in eight books,—the last written by Hirtius, an officer of Casar, — each book containing the operations of a single year. The following is a brief outline:
Book I. B.c. 58. Caesar checks the attempt of the Helvetians to settle in Western Gaul, and, after a bloody defeat, forces the remnant to return to their own territory. He then engages with a powerful tribe of Germans, who had made a military settlement in Eastern Gaui, and drives them, with their chief, Ariovistus, back across the Rhine.
Book II. B.c. 57. A formidable confederacy of the northern popula- tions of Gaul is suppressed, with the almost complete extermination of the bravest Belgian tribe, the /Vervi, in a battle which seems to have been one of the most desperate of all that Caesar ever fought. In this campaign the coast towns of the west and northwest (Brittany) also are reduced to submission.
Book III. B.C. 56. After a brief conflict with the mountaineers of the Alps, who attacked the Roman armies on their march, the chief operations are the conquest of the coast tribes of Brittany ( Veseti, etc.), in a warfare of curious naval engineering in the shallow tide- water inlets and among the rocky shores. During the season, the tribes of the southwest (Agssfans), a mining population, allied to the Iberians or Basques, are reduced by one of Czsar’s officers.
Book IV. B.C. 55. An inroad of the Germans into Northern Gaul is repulsed, and Caesar follows them by a bridge of timber hastily built across the Rhine. Returning, he crosses to Britain in the early autumn for a visit of exploration.
Book V. B.C. 54. The partial conquest of Britain (second invasion) is followed by various movements in Northern Gaul, in which the des- perate condition of the Roman garrisons is relieved after serious losses by the prudent and brave conduct of Labienus and Quintus Cicero.
Book VI. B.C. 53. Casar makes a second brief expedition across the Rhine against the Germans. Some general disturbances are quelled, and Northern Gaul is reduced to peace.
Reading Courses. lv
Book VII. B.C. 52. Vercingetorix, a brave and high-spirited chief of Southern Gaul, effects a confederacy óf the whole country, which is atlength subdued. Vercingetorix surrenders himself to secure the quiet of the country, and is taken in chains to Rome, where he was afterwards put to death at Cesar’s triumph.
Book VIII. B.c. 51. Slight insurrections breaking out here and there are easily subdued; and by the capture of the last native stronghold, Uxellodunum, the subjugation of Gaul is made complete.
VII. READING COURSES.
In order to make a wider acquaintance with the Gallic War easy and practicable, and, further, to bring greater variety and interest to the narrative for teachers and students alike, the following reading courses are suggested, any one of which covers an amount equivalent to the first four books.
CoursE I.
General Description of Gaul, Bk. i. ch. 1.
The War against the Belgian Confederacy, Bk. ii.
The Campaign against the Usipetes and Tencteri, and the First Invasion of Germany, Bk. iv. chs. 1-19.
The Second Invasion of Germany, and the Customs of the Gauls and Germans, Bk. vi. chs. 9-29.
The General Uprising of Gaul under Vercingetorix, Bk. vii.
Course II.
General Description of Gaul, Bk. i. ch. t.
The Campaign against the Helvetii, Bk. i. chs. 2-29.
The First Invasion of Britain, Bk. iv. chs. 20-36.
The Second Invasion of Britain, Bk. v. chs. 1—23.
The General Uprising of Gaul under Vercingetorix, Bk. vii.
lvi Introduction. CourRsE III.
General Description of Gaul, Bk. i. ch. r.
The Campaign against the Helvetii, Bk. i. chs. 2-29. The Campaign against Ariovistus, Bk. i. chs. 30-54. The Campaign against the Veneti, Bk. iii. chs. 7-16. Crassus in Aquitania, Bk. iii. chs. 23—27.
The Expedition against the Morini and Menapii, Bk. iii. chs. 28, 29. The First Invasion of Britain, Bk. iv. chs. 20-36.
The Second Invasion of Britain, Bk. v. chs. 1-23.
The Revolt of Ambiorix, Bk. v. chs. 24-53.
Pursuit of Ambiorix and the Punishment of the Eburones, Bk. vi
chs. 29-44.
CourseE IV.
General Description of Gaul, Bk. i. ch. 1.
The Campaign against the Helvetii, Bk. i. chs. 2-29.
The Campaign against Ariovistus, Bk. i. chs. 30-54.
The Customs of the Gauls and Germans, Bk. vi. chs. 11-29.
The Campaign against the Veneti, Bk. iii. chs. 7-16.
The Revolt of Ambiorix, Bk. v. chs. 24-53.
The Pursuit of Ambiorix, and the Punishment of the Eburones, Bk. vi. chs. 29-44.
The Uprising of Gaul under Vercingetorix, Bk. vii. chs. 1-11.
The Siege of Alesia, Bk. vii. chs. 68—9o.
CouRSE V.
General Description of Gaul, Bk. i. ch. 1. The War against the Belgian Confederacy, Bk. ii. The Campaign against the Usipetes and Tencteri, and the First Invasion of Germany, Bk. iv. chs. 1-19. _ The Second Invasion of Germany, and the Customs of the Gauls and Germans, Bk. vi. chs. 9-29. The First Invasion of Britain, Bk. iv. chs. 20—36. The Second Invasion of Britain, Bk. v. chs. 1-23.
Directions for Reading. lvii
The General Rising of Gaul under Vercingetorix, Bk. vii. chs. 1-15.
The Siege and Sack of Avaricum, Bk. vii. chs. 16-30. '
Operations against Gergovia, and Plots among the Haedui, Bk. vii, chs. 31-56
VIII. DIRECTIONS FOR READING.
-.
As “Cesar,” though in many respects a book for advanced stu- dents, is often the first Latin classic put into the learner's hands, it may be well to give a few hints as to the method of study.
1. Before beginning to read, the learner should be familiar with the forms of Inflection, the simpler rules of Agreement and Con- struction of Cases and Moods, the use of Tenses, and the Definitions of cómmon grammatical terms such as Sentence, Subject, Predicate, Object, Transitive and Intransitive, Phrase, Clause, and the like.
2. Notice at once the inflectional terminations, so that the num- ber, case, tense, person, etc., — which show the corresponding rela. tions of the words and ideas to each other, — may be present to your mind. If the form of the word gives several possibilities, hold them all in your mind, so far as may be, till something occurs in the progress of the sentence to settle the doubt.
3. Always try to take in the ideas in that order in which the Latin presents them. Read every word as if it were the last on a page and you had to turn over without being able to turn back. The mind soon becomes accustomed to the order of any language, as we see by the constant and almost unnoticed inversions of com- mon speech and poetry. If, however, you are obliged to turn back, begin again at the beginning of the sentence and proceed as before. The greatest difficulty to a beginner is his inability to remember the first parts of a complex idea. This difficulty can often be lessened by jotting down, in a loose kind of English, the words as they come in the Latin. In this way it is often easy to see what a string of words wusé mean, though we should never say anything like it in English.
4. Don't try to translate formally until you have got a com- plete idea of some integral fart of the sentence. It makes nonsense
lviii Introduction. to render words mechanically, without thinking the corresponding ideas.
5. From the outset, notice that the emphatic position of words plays a most important part in Latin writing, and try to feel the emphasis of position as you read. (See § 595-601 (343-346), and compare B. 348-351; G. 671-687; H. 663-685 (559—573) ; H-B. 620-630.)
As an illustration of $ 5 we append a translation of the first chap- ter of Book II with especial reference to the emphasis indicated by the order. As the translation is made expressly to bring out explicitly the force of order, it should not be taken as a model of desirable translation. Such a translation as is here given forces the emphasis on the attention more than is perhaps natural in English. The force is all present in the Latin, but in English it may often be left to be brought out by the context or by some kindred emphasis which the English substitutes. A short, easy passage from Book V is also given without comment for study and practice.
And BEING! thus in Z7Z:fAer * Cum esset Caesar in citeriore
Gaul as I have shown above,
Gallia, ita uti supra demónstrávi- Cz#SAR° had FREQUENT * rumors a p
mus, crébri ad eum rümórés
brought to him,® and DE
SPATCHESÜalsofrom LABIENUS" — adfer&bantur, litterisque item
continued to inform him that 2l . _ Labieni certior fiébat omnis
ALL the BELG&,® who consti-
tuted a third part of [the whole of] Gaul, as I had [previously] stated, were conspiring (for an attack] against the Roman gov-
Belgas, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixerámus, contrá popu-
lum Rómàánum coniüráre obsi-
1 The emphasis on deing binds this part of the narrative with the situation left at the end of the last book, as if it were ‘‘Czsar went to Hither Gaul, — and while he was engaged
there.”
3 Opposed to Farther Gaul, where the troops were.
3 The main subject of discourse.
* The repetition of the stories is the significant fact, ‘he deff hearing," but at the same
time the rumors are opposed to Labienus's despatches. 5 An emphasis continued in Latin from Caesar, the main person, but lost in English.
See § 598. 7 (344. 7) ; H-B. 637. 2. €, ! Opposed to the rumors.
5, © Both words together the subject of discourse, but the adjective most prominent, “the
entire body of the Beiga.”
9? Opposed to the whole, as one might say, ''e /ud/ third of the whole."
Directions for Reading. lix
erument!! and exchanging hos- tages. That for THIS CONSPIR- acy !! the reasons were fhese, 18 namely: in the first place, be- cause THEY WERE AFRAID M (i.e. in their own minds) that when Gaul was ALL ^ subdued, our army would be brought against them *" ; and in the second place, because so»te!* of the Gasuis!? (ie. from outside) were tamper- ing? with them. These Gauls were PARTLY those who were dis turbed that the ROMAN !* army should pass the winter ® and get €* footing in Gaul, just as?! they bad been unwilling that the GERMANS ** should sfay any longer 8 there, and PARTLY those who from [mere] /fic£eness *
désque inter sé dare. Coniü- randi has esse causás: primum | quod verérentur n& omni pücátà Galliá ad eds exercitus noster addücerétur; deinde quod ab nón nüllis Gallis sollicitárentur, — partim qui, ut Germános diütius in Gallia versári nólue- rant, ita populi ROmani exerci- tum hiemáre atque inveteráscere
in Gallia molesté ferébant; par-
tim qui mobilitàte et levitate
5 Here not the conspiracy itself, but the aim of it is the most important part of the idea.
3 The main subject of discourse, “now this conspiracy, the reports said,” etc.
3 The difference between "the reasons why were these” and “ these were the reasons why” is obvious. Casar might say either.
“A peculiar emphasis not directly carried out. Cicero would very likely have been more rhetorical and hove opposed '' fear " to ‘‘ being tampered with.” But Casar changes his point of view in the course of the sentence; and, as if he had said ipad in the first member, opposes to the motives of the Belga themselves, the Gauls by whom outside influ- eace was brought to bear.
15, V The completion of the business now in hand is first emphasized, then the business
V Czear brings out the whole force of the idea by opposing “ them "' to “ Gaul,” which has not before been emphatic, but which is now made so by being contrasted with the Belgians ; cf. Chiasmus, § $98. / (344. /) ; B. 350. 11, e; G. 682 and n.; H. 666. a (562); H-B. 628.
8 See note 14.
9 Opposed to the '' Germans."
9 Opposed to “ stay any longer.”
The English emphasis here represents the position of the two clauses, relative and antecedent.
93 Opposed to the “ Romans.”’
9 See note 20.
* Notice that the view of the first party is a rational idea seriously thought out, to which implied state of mind the éxconstancy of the second party is opposed.
ix Introduction. |
and ussteadiness were [always] eager for se:0** forms of govern- ment; [they were stimulated] by SOME also besides, who, inasmuch as in Gau/™ regal power was reg- ularly usurped by the more fotwer- ful™ and by those who had means to employ soldiers,® cou not SO EASILY ™ succeed in suck usurpations 9 under our imperial control!
animi novis imperiis studébant, —ab nón nüllis etiam, quod in Galliá 4 potentióribus atque eis qui ad condücendós hominés facultátis hab&bant volgó, régna
" occupübantur, qui minus facile
eam rem imp&pió,nostró cónse-
qui poterant.
3$ A natural consequence of their character. For no good reason they got tired of the
established order and wanted s change.
3$ Opposed to other countries in which the government was more stable. 97, 3 The two means of attaining regal power.
:3$ And consequently wanted to rebel.
99 The Latin often compresses into an indefinite, and to us unemphatic, word (as rea here) a whole important idea. In such cases the true emphasis appears in English only when a suitable descriptive word is substituted for the vague one according to our way of
saying things.
31 This control, of course, tended towards establishing order.
V. 23. AFTER TAKING HOSTAGES he led his army back to the sea [where he] found the ships repaired. HAVING LAUNCHED THEM, inas- much as he had a great number of captives, and some of the ships had been lost in the sféorm, he proceeded to transport his army in two voyages. And [fortunately] it so HAPPENED that out of so many ships in so many voyages not a single one was lost that carried soldiers either that year or the year defore, while of THE SHIPS which were sent back to him empty from the continent after discharging the soldiers of the first voyage, as well as of the seventy others that Labienus had built /ater, very few reached their destination. Almost all the res? were driven back.
Obsidibus acceptis exercitum re- dücit ad mare, návis invenit refectás. His déductis, quod et captivórum magnum numerum habébat, et nón nüllae tempest&te déperierant návés, duóbus commeátibus exercitum re- portüre Instituit. Ac sic accidit utl ex tantó navium numer, tot návigà- tiónibus, neque hóc neque superióre anno ülla omninó návis quae milités portaret désiderárétur; at ex eis quae inanés ex continenti ad eum remitterentur, [et] pridris commei- tüs expositis militibus, et quis posted Labiénus faciendás cüraverat nu- meró Lx, perpaucae locum caperent ; reliquae feré omnes réicerentur.
THE GALLIC WAR.
BOOK I.
CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE HELVETII AND ARIOVISTUS. B.C. 58. ‘The Nations of Gaul.
ALLIA est omnis divisa in partis trés ; quàrum ünam
incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitàni, tertiam qui ipsórum
lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. Hi omnés lingua,
Institatis, légibus inter sé differunt. Gallos ab Aquitünis Garumna flümen, à Belgis Mátrona et Séquana dividit.
Their Characters Compared.
Hórum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, proptered quod 4 cultü atque hümàánitüte próvinciae longissimé absunt, mini- méque ad eds mercátórés saepe commeant atque ea quae ad efféminandós animós pertinent important; proximique sunt Germànis qui trans Rhénum incolunt! quibuscum con- tinenter bellum gerunt. Quà dé causa Helvétii quoque teliqués Gallos virtüte praecédunt, quod feré cotidiànis proeliis cum Germánis contendunt, cum aut suis finibus eós prohibent aut ipsi in eórum finibus bellum gerunt.
C£. ! divisa, L 1.—* incolunt, 1. 2.
2 The Gallic War. (Cesar
The Territories of Each.
Eorum üna pars,' quam Gallos obtinére dictum est, ini tium capit à flümine Rhodano; continétur Garumnà flümine, Oceano, finibus Belgárum ; attingit etiam ab Séquanis et Helvétiis flumen Rhénum; vergit ad septentriónés. ^ Bel-
3 gae ab extrémis Galliae finibus oriuntur, pertinent ad in- feriorem partem flüminis Rhéni, spectant in septentri- onem et orientem solem. Aquitània à Garumnà flümine ad Pyrénaeds montis et eam partem Oceani quae est ad Hispániam pertinet ;* spectat inter occásum solis et septen-
10 trionés.
Orgetorix with his Fellow Nobies Forms a Pian to Invade Gaul.
2. Apud Helvétios longé® nóbilissimus fuit et ditissimus Orgetorix. Is, M. Messala et M. Pisone consulibus, regni cupiditàte inductus coniürátionem nobilitàtis fécit, et civi- tàti persuásit ut dé finibus suis cum omnibus copiis exirent :
15 perfacile esse, cum virtüte omnibus praestárent, totius Gal- liae imperio potiri. He Persuades his People, tbe Helvetii.
Id hoc facilius eis persuásit, quod undique loci natira Helvétii continentur:* ina ex parte flümine Rhéno látissimo atque altissimo, qui agrum Helvétium à GermAnis dividit ;
20 alterá ex parte monte Jira altissimo, qui est inter Sequanos et Helvétiós; tertia lacü Lemanné et flümine Rhodano, qui provinciam nostram ab Helvetiis dividit.
They Assent, being Warlike and feeling Cramped by their Narrow Limits.
His rébus fiébat ut et minus làté vagdrentur et minus facile finitimis bellum inferre possent ; quà ex parte homi-
Cf. ! partis, p. 1, l. 1. — ? pertinent, 1. 5. — * longissimé, 1, 7.— * continétur, 1. 2.
B.G.L3] Campaign against the Helvetii. 3
nés bellandi cupidi màgno dolóre adficiébantur. Prd
multitüdine autem hominum et pró gloria belli atque
fortitüdinis, angustós sé finis! habére arbitrabantur, qui in
longitüdinem milia passuum ccxL, in látitüdinem cLxxx
patebant. 5 They Employ Two Years in Preparations.
3. His rebus adducti et auctóritáte Orgetorigis permóti cOnstituérunt ea quae ad proficiscendum pertinérent ? compa- ráre, iümentorum et carrorum quam maximum numerum coémere, sémentis quam maximdas facere, ut in itinere copia frümenti suppeteret, cum proximis? civitátibus pàcem et ro amicitiam confirmare. Ad eds rés conficiendás biennium sibi satis esse düxérunt; in tertium annum profectionem lége confirmant.
by Orgetorix Conspires with Other Gallic Chiefs.
Ad eds rés conficiendas Orgetorix déligitur. Is sibi léga- tiónem ad civitatis suscépit. In eó itinere persuádet* Cas- 15 tico, Catamantàloedis filio, Séquan6, cüius pater régnum in Séquanis multos annos obtinuerat et à senátü populi Romani amicus appellatus erat, ut régnum in civitate sua occupáret, quod pater ante habuerat ; itemque Dumnorigi Haeduó, frátri Diviciáci, qui eó tempore principatum in civi- 20 tate obtinébat ac maximé plébi acceptus erat, ut idem cona- tétur persuadet, eique filiam suam in màátrimónium dat.
His Arguments.
Perfacile factü esse illis probat conata perficere, proptereà quod ipse suae civitatis imperium obtentürus esset: nón esse dubium quin tótius Galliae plürimum Helvétii possent; 25 Sé suis copiis suóque exercitü illis régna conciliátürum cón-
Cf.! finibus, p. 2, 1. 3. —? pertinent, 2, 5. —? proximi, 1, 9. —
! persuásit, 2, 14. — 5 obtinére, 2, 1.
4 The Gallic War. [CASAR
firmat. Hac orátióne adducti inter sé fidem et iüsiarandum dant, et régnó occupátó! per trés potentissimos ac firmissi- més populos totius Galliae sésé potiri? posse spérant.
Orgetorix is Brought to Trial.
4. Ea rés est Helvétiis per indicium énüntiáta. Moribus 5 suis Orgetorigem ex vinculis causam dicere coégérunt. Dam- nátum poenam sequi oportébat ut igni cremàárétur.
He Escapes.
Dié constitütà* causae dictionis Orgetorix ad iüdicium omnem suam familiam, ad hominum milia decem, undique coégit, et omnis clientis obaerátosque suós, quorum. magnum
10 numerum habébat, eddem condüxit; per eds né causam diceret sé éripuit. His Death.
Cum civitás ob eam rem incitáta armis iüs suum exsequi cónárétur, multitüdinemque hominum ex agris magistrátüs cogerent,* Orgetorix mortuus est; neque abest suspició, ut
15 Helvétil arbitrantur, quin ipse sibi mortem cónsciverit.
Still the Helvetii Persist in the Attempt.
5. Post éius mortem nihilo minus Helvétii id quod cón- stituerant facere cónantur,' ut é finibus suis exeant. Ubi iam sé ad eam rem paratos esse arbitráti sunt, oppida sua omnia, numero ad duodecim, vicos ad quadringentos, reliqua
20 privata aedificia incendunt; frimentum’ omne, praeter quod sécum portátüri erant, combürunt, ut — domum reditiónis spé sublata — parátiorés ad omnia pericula subeunda essent ; trium ménsium molita cibária sibi quemque domó efferre iubent.
Cf. ! occuparet, p. 3, 1. 19. — * potirl, 2, 16. — * cónstitubrunt, 5 7. —‘ coégit, 1. 9. — 5 cOnarétur, 1. 13. —5 exirent, 2, 14. — ? frümenti, $ 10.
A
B.G.I.6] Campaign against the Helvetii. 5
Other Tribes are Persuaded to Join them.
Persu&dent Rauracis et Tulingis et Latobrigis finitimis uti eodem ‘si oünsilio, oppidis suis vicisque exüstis, ind cum eis proficiscantur!; Boiosque, qui trans Rhénum inco- luerant et in agrum Noricum tránsierant Nóréiamque oppüg- nàrant, receptós ad sé socios sibi adsciscunt.
Two Routes for Invasion Described.
6. Erant omninó itinera duo quibus itineribus domó exire possent: ünum per Séquanés, angustum et difficile,
Fio. 6.—Mar or Hatveria,
inter montem Iüram et flümen Rhodanum, vix quà singuli carri® dücerentur; móns autem altissimus impendébat, ut
Cf. ! proficiscendum, p. 3, l. 7. — ? carrérum, 3, 8.
6 The Gallic War. (Caesar facile perpauci prohibére! possent: alterum per provinciam . nostram, multo facilius atque expeditius, proptered quod inter finis. Helvétiorum ‘et Allobrogum, qui nüper pácáti erant, Rhodanus fluit, isque non nüllis locis vado tránsitur.* $ Extrémum oppidum Allobrogum est proximumque" Helvé- tiorum finibus Genüva.
They Decide to March through the Province.
Ex eó oppidó pons ad Helvétids pertinet. . Allobrogibus sésé vel persuásürós (quod nóndum. bono aniníó in populum Romanum - vidérentur) existimabant, vel vi coáctüros* ut
ro per suds finis eds ire paterentur. Omnibus rébus ad. pro- fectionem comparátis diem dicunt qu£ dié ad ripam Rho- dani omnés conveniant. Is diés erat a. d. v. Kal. Apr., L. Pisone A. Gabinio cónsulibus.
Cesar Resolves to Stop them, and Destroys the Bridge near Geneva.
7..Caesari cum id nüntiátum esset eds per próvinciam
15 nostram iter facere cónári màtürat ab urbe proficisci? et quam maximis potest itineribus in Galliam ulteriorem con- tendit et ad Genávam pervenit. Provinciae toti quam maximum potest militum numerum imperat (erat omnino in Gallia ulteriore legio ina), pontem qui erat ad Genávam
20 iubet rescindi. They Ask Caesar's Permission.
Ubi dé ius adventü Helvétil certiorés facti sunt, légitds ad eum mittunt nobilissimos civitátis, cüius légàátionis' Namméius et Verudoctius principem locum obtinébant, qui dicerent *sibi esse in animó sine ülló malefició iter per pró-
25 vinciam facere, proptereà quod aliud iter? habérent nüllum ; rogáre ut éius voluntate id sibi facere liceat.'
Cf. ! prohibent, p. r, 1. 14. —? tránsierant, 5, 4. — * proximis, 3, 10. —‘ coégit, 4, 9. —* cnantur, 4, 17. —* proficiscantur, 5, 3. — ' légi- tiónem, 3, 14. — * itinera, 5, 6.
B.G.L8] Campaign against the Helvetii. | Gf
Caesar i but Puts them off to Gain Tire.
Caesar, quod memoria tenébat L. Cassium cónsulem occisum exercitumque' éius ab Helvétiis pulsum et sub iugum missum, concédendum nón putübat; neque hominés inimicó animé, datü facultáte per provinciam itineris faci- undi! temperátürós ab iniürià et maleficio existimabat 5 Tamen, ut spatium intercédere posset dum" milites quos imperaverat convenirent,® légátis respondit diem sé ad déliberandum simptirum ; .si quid vellent, ad Id. Apf. reverterentur. n 2
/ Csesar Constructs Fortifications to Stop the Helvetii.
8. Intered ea legióne quam sécum habébat militibusque ro qui ex provinciá convénerant, à lacü Lemanné, qui in flümen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Iüram, qui finis Séquanorum ab Helvétiis dividit, milia passuum decem novem mürum
in altitidinem pedum sédecim fossamque perdücit. Eo opere perfecto * praesidia disponit, castella comminit, quod 15 facilius, si sé invitó tránsire cónárentur, prohibére posset.
The Helvetii Attempt to Pass, but are Repulsed.
Ubi ea diés quam constituerat cum légátis vénit, et légati ad eum revertérunt, negat sé more et exempló populi Ro- mini posse iter alli per próvinciam dare ; et, si vim facere conentur, prohibitürum: ostendit. Helvétii eà spé déiecti, 20 nivibus iünctis ratibusque complüribus factis, alii vadis* Rhodani, qua’ minima altitüdó flüminis erat, nón numquam interdiü, saepius? noctü,si perrumpere possent cónáti, operis münitione et militum concursü et télis repulsi, hóc cónátü déstitérunt. 2$
Cf. ! facere, p. 6, 1.25. — 3 existimabant, 6, 9. — * conveniant, 6, 12. —' perficere, 3, 33. — reverterentur, l. 9. —* vado, 6, 4. —" qui, 5, 8 — saepe, 7, &.
8 The Gallic War. [Carsar
Through the Influence of Dumnorix, a Hseduan, they are Allowed to Pass through the Sequanian Territory.
9. Relinquébatur fina per Séquanos via, qua Séquanis invitis! propter angustiás? ire non poterant. His cum sua sponte persuddére nón possent, légáàtos ad Dumnorigem Haeduum mittunt, ut ed déprecatore à Séquanis impetra-
s rent. Dumnorix gratia et largitione apud Sequanos plüri- mum? poterat et Helvétiis erat amicus, quod ex ea civitate Orgetorigis filiam in màtrimónium düxerat; et cupiditate régni adductus novis rébus studébat et quam plürimàs civi- tatis sud beneficio habere obstrictás volebat. Itaque rem
to suscipit et à Sequanis impetrat ut per finis suos Helvétios ire patiantur,‘ obsidésque uti inter sésé dent perficit: Se- quani, né itinere Helvétios prohibeant; Helvétii, ut sine maleficio et iniürià transeant.
Ceesar Opposes this Movement also.
10. Caesari renüntiátur Helvétiis esse in animó* per
r5 agrum Séquanorum et Haeduorum iter in Santonum finis
facere, qui nón longé5 à Tolosátium finibus absunt, quae
civitás est in Provincia. Id si fieret,' intellegebat magno
cum periculo? próvinciae futürum ut hominés bellicosos,
populi Rómàni inimicos, locis patentibus * maximéque frü- 20 mentàriis finitimos habéret.
He Takes Active Measures.
Ob eds causás ei münitióni ? quam fécerat T. Labiénum légátum praeficit; ipse in Italiam magnis itineribus conten- dit duàsque ibi legionés conscribit, et trés quae circum
Cf. ! invitó, p. 7, 1. 16. —* angustum, 5, 7. —* plürimum, 3, 25.—
4 paterentur, 6, 10. — 5 esse in animó, 6, 24. — 5 longissimé, r, 7. — ' fi&- bat, 2, 23. — * pericula, 4, 22. — ? patébant, 3, 5. — !? münitióne, 7, 24.
Fio. 7.—JUNcTion or Tux Ruowz AND Sadwa.
B.G.Ln] Campaign against Ariovistus. 9
Aquiléiam hiemábant ex hibernis édücit, et, quà proximum iter in ulteriorem! Galliam per Alpis erat, cum his quinque legionibus ire contendit.
Bome Tribes Resist his March, but he Crosses the Rhone with his Army.
Ibi Ceutrones et Gráioceli et Caturiges locis superioribus occupátis itinere exercitum prohibére conantur. Complüri- bus his proeliis pulsis,! ab Oceló, quod est citerioris provin- ciae extrémum, in finis Vocontiórum ulterioris próvinciae dié septimo pervenit;* inde in Allobrogum finis, ab Allo- brogibus in Segusiávos exercitum dücit, Hi sunt extra provinciam tráns Rhodanum primi.
The Helvetii Commit Depredations on their March, and Several Tribes Ask for Caesar's Help against them.
1L Helvétii iam per angustias et finis Séquanórum suds cópids trádüxerant, et in Haeduorum finis pervénerant eórumque agrós populàbantur. Haedui, cum sé suaque ab eis défendere nón possent, légátos ad Caesarem mittunt rogátum * auxilium: ‘Ita sé omni tempore dé populo Ro- mind meritos esse ut paene in cónspectü exercitüs nostri agri vastári, liberi [eorum] in servitütem abdüci, oppida ex- -pügnári nón débuerint! Eddem tempore Haedui Ambarri, necessarii et consanguinei Haeduórum, Caesarem certiorem* faciunt sésé dépopulatis agris non facile ab oppidis vim hostium prohibére. Item Allobroges, qui trans Rhodanum vicos* possessidnésque habébant, fugi sé ad Caesarem recipiunt et démonstrant sibi praeter agri solum nihil esse reliqui! Quibus rébus adductus Caesar nón exspectandum sibi statuit dum, omnibus fortünis sociórum * cónsümptis, in Santonos Helvétii pervenirent.
Cf. ! ulteriorem, p. 6, 1. 16. — ? pulsum, 7, 2. —* pervenit, G 17. —
* rogare, 6, 26. — 5 certidrés, 6, 21. —* vicos, 4, 19. —" reliqua, 4, 19. — * socibe, 5, 5.
IO
5
IO The Gallic War. [CaksAx
The Helvetii Attempt to Cross the Saóne.
12. Flümen est Arar, quod per finis Haeduórum et Séquanorum in Rhodanum influit, incrédibili lénitàte ita ut oculis in utram partem fluat iüdicàri nón possit. Id Helvétii ratibus ac lintribus iünctis transibant. Ubi per
5 explorátorés Caesar certior factus est trés iam partis cópi- drum Helvétios id flümen trádüxisse,! quartam feré partem citrà flimen Ararim reliquam esse, dé tertia vigilia cum legionibus tribus e castris profectus, ad eam partem per- vénit quae nondum flümen transierat.
Caesar Cuts to Pieces a Part (the Tigurini), Who had not yet Crossed.
i0 Eos impeditos et inopinantis adgressus mágnam partem eorum concidit ; reliqui sésé fugae mandàárunt atque in proximds ? silvàs abdidérunt. Is pàgus appellabatur Tiguri- nus; nam omnis civitàs Helvétia in quattuor pàágos divisa est. Hic pagus anus, cum domo exisset, * patrum nostrorum
15 Memoria L. Cassium cónsulem interfecerat et éius exercitum
sub iugum miserat.
Thus he Wipes out a Long-standing Disgrace.
Ita sive cásü sive consilio deorum immortalium, quae pars
Fic. 8. — Coin or Prso. Fre. g. — Corn or Cassius.
civitatis Helvétiae insignem calamitàtem populo Rómàno intulerat ea princeps poenás persolvit. Quà in ré Caesar
Cf. 1 trádüxerant, p. 9, 1.12. — * proficisci, 6, 15. —* proximum, 9, I. * exire, 5, 7. — 5 inferre, 2, 24.
B.G.L13.) Campaign against the Helvetii. II
nón sólum püblicás sed etiam privatas iniirids ultus est ; quod éius soceri L. Pisonis avum, L. Pisonem légátum, Tigurini eodem proelio qué Cassium interfécerant.
Ceosar Crosses the Saéne.
13. Hoc proelió facto, reliquás cópiás Helvétiorum ut consequi posset, pontem in Arari faciendum cürat atque ita exercitum tradücit.
The Helvetii Send an Embassy.
Helvétii repentinó éius adventü! commóti, cum id quod ipsi diébus xx aegerrimé cónfécerant,! ut flümen tránsirent, illum unó dié fécisse intellegerent! légdtds ad eum mittunt ; cüius légationis Divicd princeps fuit, qui bello Cassiano dux Helvétiorum fuerat.
Divico's Speech.
Is ita cum Caesare égit: ‘Si pácem populus Rómànus cum Helvétiis faceret, in eam partem itüros atque ibi futüros Helvétios ubi eds Caesar cónstituisset * atque esse volu- isset; sin belló persequi persevéràret, reminiscerétur et veteris incommodi populi Romani et pristinae virtütis Hel- véiorum. Quod improvisó ünum pagum adortus esset, cum ei qui flümen transissent suis auxilium 5 ferre nón possent, né ob eam rem aut suae mágnopere virtüti tribu- eret aut ipsos déspiceret; sé ita à patribus maàioribusque suis didicisse ut magis virtüte contenderent quam doló aut insidiis niterentur. Quá ré né committeret ut is locus ubi constitissent ex calamitüàte populi Romani et internecione exercitiis nómen caperét aut memoriam proderet.'
Cf.! advent, p. 6, 1. 21. — 3 cSnficiendis, 3, 11. — * intellegébat, 8, 17. — * constitit, 4, 7. —* auxilium, 9, 15.
[al
Oo
I2 The Gallic War. [Carsaz
Caesar's Reply.
14. His Caesar ita respondit: *Eo sibi minus dubitatidnis dari quod eds rés quads légati Helvétii commemorüssent memoriá tenéret,' atque ed gravius ferre, quo minus meritd populi Roómáni accidissent ; qui si alicüius iniüriae sibi con-
s scius fuisset, nón fuisse difficile cavére; sed eó déceptum, quod neque commissum 4 sé intellegeret? quà ré timéret, neque sine causá timendum putáret? Quod si veteris* con- tuméliae oblivisci vellet, num etiam recentium iniüriárum, quod eó invitó* iter per provinciam per vim temptüssent,
to quod Haeduós, quod Ambarrós, quod Allobrogas vexássent, memoriam dépGnere posse? Quod sua victoria tam inso- lenter gloridrentur, quodque tam diü sé impüne iniüriàs tulisse* admirürentur, eódem pertinére.’ Cónsuésse enim deós immortülis, qué gravius hominés ex commitadtidne
15 rérum doleant, quós pró scelere eorum ulcisci? velint, his secundiorés interdum rés et diüturniorem impünitátem concédere.’
He Proposes Terms, Which are not Accepted.
Cum ea ita sint, tamen si obsidés ab eis sibi dentur, uti ea quae polliceantur factüros intellegat, et si Haeduis dé 20 jiniüriis quds ipsis sociisque eorum intulerint, item si Allo- brogibus satisfaciant, sésé cum eis pàcem esse factürum.' Divicó respondit: ‘Ita Helvétios à madidribus © suis Insti- tütós esse uti obsidés accipere, nón dare, cénsuérint;" éius rei populum Rómánum esse testem. | Hoc respónsó dató
25 discessit.
Cf. ! tenébat, p. 7, 1. 1. — * intellegSbat, 8, 17. —* putibat, 7, 3. — * veteris, 11, 16. — 5 invitó, 7, 16. —* ferre, 1. 3. —" pertinent, 1, 9. — 8 ultus, r1, 1. — * concédendum, 7, 3. — miidribus, 11, 20. — ! cón- eutese, |. 13.
B.G.1.16.) Campaign against the Helvetii. 13
' Slight Reverse of Ceesar's Cavalry.
15. Postero dié castra ex eo locó movent. Idem facit Caesar, equitatumque omnem, ad numerum quattuor milium, quem ex omni próvincià et Haeduis atque eórum sociis coáctum! habébat, praemittit qui videant quás in partis hostés iter faciant Qui cupidius? novissimum agmen inse- citi aliéno loco cum equitátü Helvétiorum proelium com- mittunt; et pauci dé nostris cadunt.
The Helvetii Move on; Csesar Follows.
Qué proelió sublati Helvétii, quod quingentis equitibus tantam multitüdinem equitum prdpulerant, .audácius subsis- tere nón numquam? et novissimó agmine proelió nostros lacessere coepérunt. Caesar suds à proelio continébat, ac satis habébat in praesentiá hostem rapinis [pabulatidnibus ] populàtionibusque prohibére. Ita diés circiter quindecim iter fécérunt uti inter novissimum hostium agmen et nos- trum primum nón amplius quinis aut sénis milibus passuum interesset.
The Hsedui Neglect to Furnish Grais.
16 Interim cotidié Caesar Haeduos frümentum quod esent püblicé polliciti flagitàre. Nam propter frigora, quod Gallia sub septentriónibus* (ut ante dictum est) posita est, nón modo frümenta in agris màtüra non erant, sed né pabuli quidem satis magna cópia suppetébat;* ed autem frümentó quod flümine Arari navibus subvéxerat proptereà Minus iti poterat, quod iter ab Arari Helvétii áverterant, à qubus discedere nolébat. Diem ex dié dücere Haedui; conferri, comportári, adesse dicere.
Cfi colgit, p- 4 1. 9. —? cupidi, 3, 1. — * nón numquam, 7, 22. — ' wrtentriónls, 2, 4. — 5 suppeteret, 3, 10. — 5 discessit, 12, 25.
25
14 The Gallic War. [CAxsan
Casar Summons their Chiefs and Upbraids them.
Ubi sé diütius düci intellexit! et diem instare qué dié frümentum militibus métiri oportéret, convocátis eórum prin- cipibus, quorum màgnam copiam in castris habébat, — in
Fic. 10.—Loapinc Boats wit SurrLns.
his Diviciáco et Liscd, qui summo magistrátui praeerat quem 5 vergobretum appellant Haedui, qui creatur annuus et vitae necisque in suds habet potestatem, — graviter? eds accüsat, quod, cum neque emi neque ex agris sümi* posset, tam necessárió tempore, tam propinquis hostibus, ab eis nón
C£. intellegébat, p. 8, 1.17. — gravius, 12, 14.—* smptürum, 7,8.
B.G.1.18.] Campaign against the Helvetii. I5
sublevétur; praesertim cum magna ex parte eorum precibus
adductus bellum suscéperit,! multó etiam gravius quod sit
déstitütus queritur.
Liscus Explains the Situation: a Party Opposed to the Romans Prevents the Supply.
17. Tum démum Liscus órátione Caesaris adductus quod anteà tacuerat proponit: ‘ Esse nón nüllos* quorum auctóri- 5 tas apud plébem® plürimum valeat, qui privatim plüs possint quam ipsi magistrátüs. Hos séditiosà atque improba oráti- One multitüdinem déterrére né frümentum conferant * quod debeant: praestáre, si iam príncipátum* Galliae obtinére " non possint, Gallorum quam Románorum imperia perferre; ro neque dubitare quin, si Helvétios superaverint Romàáni, fina cum reliquá Gallia Haeduis libertátem sint éreptüri' Ab eisdem nostra cónsilia quaeque in castris gerantur hostibus &nüntiàri;* hós 4 sé coércéri nón posse. Quin etiam, quod necessárió rem coáctus Caesari enüntiürit, intellegere sésé 15
quantó id cum periculo fécerit, et ob eam causam quam diü potuerit tacuisse.'
Liscus Privately Discioses the Ambition and Treachery of Dumnorix, who Favors the Heivetii.
18. Caesar hic orátione Lisci Dumnorigem, Diviciáci fritrem, désignari sentiébat ; sed, quod plüribus praesenti- bus eás rés iactári nolébat,? celeriter concilium dimittit, 20 Liscum.retinet. Quaerit ex sóló ea quae in conventü dix- erat Dicit liberius atque audacius." Eadem sécrétd ab aliis quaerit ; reperit esse véra : ‘Ipsum esse Dumnorigem, Summa audáacià, mágnà apud plébem propter liberdlitatem gratia,” cupidum rérum nováàrum. Compliris annós portoria 25
Cf. ! suscipit, p.8, l. 10. —? nón nüllis, 6, 4. —? plébi, 3, 21. — * cón- ferri, 13, 25. — 5 princípátum, 3, 20. — 5 obtinébant, 6, 23. — &ripuit,
4 11.— 5 énfintiita, 4, 4. — * ndlébat, 13, 24. — !? audácius, 13, 9. lt titii, 8, 5.
16 The Gallic War. [CAESAR
reliquaque omnia Haeduórum vectigalia parvó pretio re- démpta habére, proptereà quod illo licente contra licéri audeat némó. His rébus et suam rem familidrem auxisse et facultatis ad largiendum máàgnàs comparásse; magnum 5$ numerum equitütüs sud sümptü semper alere et circum sé habére, neque solum domi sed etiam apud finitimas! civita- tis largiter posse; atque hüius potentiae causá matrem in Biturigibus homini illic nobilissimo ac potentissimo conlo- cisse, ipsum ex Helvétiis uxorem habére, sorórem ex mátre I0 et propinquás suds nüptum in alids civitátis conlocásse. Favére et cupere Helvétiis propter eam adfinitatem, odisse etiam suó nomine Caesarem et Rómánós, quod eórum ad- ventü potentia éius déminüta et Diviciácus frater in antiquum locum gratiae atque honoris sit restitütus. Si quid accidat 15 Rómánis, summam in spem per Helvétios régni obtinendi? venire; imperió populi Romàni nón modo dé régno, sed etiam dé eà quam habeat grátia, déspéráre. . Reperiébat ? etiam in quaerendó * Caesar, quod proelium equestre adver- sum paucis * ante diébus esset factum, initium * [éius] fugae 20 factum à Dumnorige atque eius equitibus, — nam equitatui, quem auxilió Caesari Haedui miserant, Dumnorix praeerat ;" eorum fuga reliquum esse equitatum perterritum.
Ceesar Thinks that Dumnorix should be Punished.
19. Quibus rébus cognitis, cum ad has suspiciónés certis- simae rés accéderent, — quod per finis Séquanérum Helvé- 25 tios trádüxisset, quod obsidés inter eds dandós cürásset,' quod ea omnia nón modo iniüssü suo et civitatis sed etiam inscientibus ipsis fécisset, quod à magistratü Haeduórum accüsürétur, — satis esse causae arbitrabatur® quà ré in
Cf. ! finitimds, p. 8, 1. 20. — * obtinbre, 15, 9. — ® reperit, 15, 23. —‘ quaerit, 15, 23. — 5 pauci, 15, 7. — * initium, 2, 1. —" praeerat, 14, 4. —* cürat, 11, 5. — ? arbitrantur, 4, 15.
Fic. 11.—Gatiic Remains.
tind s. Necklaces with amber and coral pendants. 2. Military standard. 4. Bronte trumpet (camyx). s. Iron boss of shield. 6. Iron holder. 7. Sword-hilt and girdle. 8. Iron helmet. 9. Iron belt-chain.
B.G.1.20.] Campaign against the Helvetii. I7
eum aut ipse animadverteret aut civitátem animadvertere iubéret.
But Summons Diviciacus, Whom he does not Wish to Offend.
His omnibus rébus ünum repügnábat, quod Diviciáci fratris summum in populum Rómánum studium, summam in sé voluntatem,' égregiam fidem, iüstitiam, temperantiam cógno- 5 verat: nam né éius supplicio Diviciáci animum offenderet verébátur. Itaque prius quam quicquam coónàrétur,! Divi- cidcum ad sé vocari iubet, et cotididnis® interpretibus remotis per C. Valerium Procillum, principem * Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rérum 1o fidem habébat, cum eó conloquitur; simul commonefacit quae ipso praesente in concilio [Gallorum] dé Dumnorige sint dicta; et ostendit quae séparátim quisque dé eo apud sé dixerit; petit atque hortátur ut sine éius offénsione animi vel ipse de eó, causá cógnità, statuat? vel civitátem 15 statuere iubeat.
Diviciacus Pleads for his Brother's Pardon.
. 20. Diviciácus, multis cum lacrimis Caesarem complexus, obsecráre coepit né quid gravius in frátrem statueret: 'Scire sé illa esse véra, nec quemquam ex eó plüs quam sé doloris' Capere, proptereà quod, cum ipse gratia plürimum domi 20 atque in reliqua Gallia, ille minimum propter adulescentiam posset, per sé crévisset ; quibus opibus ac nervis nón solum ad minuendam grátiam sed paene ad perniciem suam üter& tur; sésé tamen et amore fráternó et existimatione volgi commovéri. Quod si quid ei à Caesare gravius accidisset,? 25 cum ipse eum locum amicitiae apud eum tenéret, néminem ?? Cf. 1 voluntáte, p. 6, 1. 26. —? conári, 6, 15. —* cotidiánis, 1, 12.
— principibus, 14, 2. — 5 ostendit, 7, 20. —* statuit, 9, 25. —-" dolóre, 3 1.—? Gti, 13, 23. — * accidat, 16, 14. — 1? n&mó, 16, 3.
I8 The Gallic War. [Cassar
existim&türum! nón sud voluntate factum; qua ex ré futürum uti tótius Galliae animi 4 sé averterentur.’ ?
And for his Sake Dumnorix ie Spared.
Haec cum plüribus verbis fléns à Caesare peteret, Caesar
eius dextram prendit; consólátus rogat finem orandi faciat;
$ tanti éius apud sé grátiam esse ostendit uti et rei püblicae
iniüriam et suum dolórem éius voluntati ac precibus® con-
donet. Dumnorigem ad sé vocat, fratrem adhibet; quae in
eo reprehendat ostendit; quae ipse intellegat, quae civitàs
querátur proponit ;* monet ut in reliquum tempus omnis
IO suspicionés vitet ; praeterita sé Diviciáco fratri condonàre
dicit. Dumnorigi custodés ponit, ut quae agat, quibuscum loquátur, scire possit.
Ceesar Prepares for a Battie.
21. Eódem dié ab exploratéribus® certior factus hostis sub monte cónsédisse milia passuum ab ipsius castris octo, r5 quàlis esset nàtüra montis et qualis in circuitü ascensus, qui cognoscerent misit. Renüntiátum" est facilem esse. Dé tertià vigilia® T. Labiénum, légátum pro praetore, cum duábus legionibus et eis ducibus qui iter cognoverant, sum- mum iugum montis ascendere iubet; quid sui consili? sit 20 ostendit. Ipse dé quartà vigilià eodem itinere quo hostés ierant ad eds contendit, equitátumque omnem ante sé mittit. P. Considius, qui rei militáris peritissimus habébatur et in exercitü L. Sullae et posteà in M. Crassi fuerat, cum explo- ratéribus praemittitur.
Cf. ! existimabat, p. 7, 1. 5. —? áverterant, 13, 23. — * precibus, 15, I. —* queritur, 15, 3. — 5 própünit, 15, 5. — explórátórés, 10, 5. — * renünti&tur, 8, 14. —® vigili, 10, 7. —? cónsilia, 15, 153. — P? prae mittit, 13, 4.
BG.L22] Campaign against the Helvetii. 19
Considius, being Panic-stricken, Delays the Plan. 22. Prima lüce, cum summus mons à Labiéno tenérétur, ipse ab hostium castris nón longius! mille et quingentis passibus abesset! neque, ut posted ex captivis comperit, aut
Vic. 13.— CAYAURYMAN CHARGING, FiO. 13. — CAVALRYMAN WITH Vexillumt,
ipsius adventus aut Labiéni cognitus? esset, Considius equó admissó ad eum accurrit; dicit montem quem à Labiéno occupari* voluerit® ab hostibus tenéri ; id sé à Gallicis armis atque insignibus cógnóvisse. Caesar suds cópiàs in proxi- mum * collem subdücit, aciem instruit. Labiénus, ut erat ei praeceptum 4 Caesare né proelium committeret, nisi ipsius cdpiae prope hostium castra visae essent, ut undique and tempore in hostis impetus fieret, monte occupátó nostrós erspectábat proelioque abstinébat. Multó dénique dié per explórátórés Caesar cógnóvit et montem à suis tenéri et
Cf. ! longé, p. 8,1. 16. — absunt, 1, 7.—* cógnbverat, 17, 5.—*0o- splitis, 9, 5.—* velint, 12, 15.—* proximis, 10, 12.
o
20 The Gallic War. [CarsaR
Helvétids castra móvisse! et Considium timore perterritum quod nón vidisset pro viso sibi renüntiásse. Eo dié, quo consuérat intervállo, hostis sequitur et milia passuum tria ab eorum castris castra ponit.
Caesar Turns towards Bibracte to Get Supplies. The Helvetii, Emboldened, Follow him.
s 23. Postridié éius diéi, quod omnino? biduum supererat cum exercitui frümentum metiri * oportéret,f* et quod à Bi- bracte, oppido Haeduorum longé maximo et cópiosissimo, nón amplius" milibus passuum xvii aberat, rei frümentáriae prospiciendum existimavit ; i/ague iter ab Helvétiis avertit
1o ac Bibracte ire contendit. Ea rés per fugitivos L. Aemili, decurionis equitum Gallórum, hostibus nüntiátur. Helvetii, seu quod timore perterritos Romànos discédere à sé existi- márent, eo magis quod pridié superioribus locis occupatis proelium nón commisissent, sive ed quod ré frimentaria ®
15 interclüdi posse confiderent, commütáto consilio atque iti- nere converso nostrós 4 novissimó * agmine insequi ? ac lacessere !! coepérunt.
Both Sides Prepare for Battle.
24. Postquam id animum advertit, cópiás suds Caesar in proximum collem subdücit equitatumque qui sustinéret
20 hostium impetum ? misit. Ipse interim in colle medio tri- plicem aciem instrixit™ legionum quattuor veteránürum ; sed
in summo iugó duds legiónés quas in Gallia citeriore * prox- imé conscripserat et omnia auxilia conlocári, [ac totum mon- tem hominibus compléri, et intereá] sarcinás in ünum locum
Cf. ! movent, p. 13, 1. 1. — ? omninó, 6, 18. — ® metiri, 14, 2. — * opor- téret, 14, 2. — 5 amplius, 15, 1 5. — * contendit, 18, 21. — " committeret, I9, 9. — * friimentariis, 8, 19. —? novissimum, 13, 5. — 1? insecüti, 13, $. — 11 Jacessere, 13, 11. — 1? impetus, 19, 11. — 1? instruit, 19, 8. — 14 citerioris, 9, 6.
B.G.Ls4] Campaign against tke Heivetis. ar
conferri, et eum ab his qui in superidre acié cónstiterant! müniri iussit Helvétii cum omnibus suis carris seciitl,
Fao. 14.—Sotpmens Mancuina wire PACKS (sarcinas).
impedimenta in ünum locum contulérunt ; ipsi confertis- sima acié, réiectó nostro equitàtü, phalange facta, sub primam nostram aciem successérunt.
CK. ! cónstitissent, p. 11, 1.23.
22 The Gallic War. (Crean
The Battle.
25. Caesar primum suó deinde omnium ex cónspectü'! remótis equis, ut aequátó omnium periculó spem fugae tol- leret, cohortátus suds proelium commisit. Milités € locó superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfrégé-
$ runt. E& disiectd, gladiis déstrictis in eds impetum fécé- runt. Gallis mágnó ad pügnam erat impedimentó quod, plüribus eorum scütis find ictü pllorum tránsfixis et conli- gatis, cum ferrum sé infléxisset, neque évellere neque sinistr&
—- ee
eo
OO ES EE ——————— oo
Fic. 15. — Roman JAvVELins (ia).
impedità* satis commodé pügnáre poterant, multi ut diü 10 lactáto bracchio praeoptürent scütum mani émittere et nüdó corpore pügnüre. Tandem volneribus défessi et pedem referre et, quod mons aberat circiter mille passuum, eó sé recipere coepérunt. Captó monte et succédentibus* nos- tris, Boil et Tulingi, qui hominum milibus circiter xv agmen 15 hostium claudébant et novissimis praesidió erant, ex itinere nostros a? latere apertó adgressi * circumvenire; et id cdnspi- cati Helvétii, qui in montem sésé recéperant, rürsus instire et proelium redintegráre coepérunt. Rómiünl conversa signa bipartitó intulérunt: prima et secunda aciés, ut victis ac 20 submótis resisteret; tertia, ut venientis sustinéret.
C£ ! cónspectü, p. 9, 1. 16. —?* impeditis, 10, 10. —* succeselirunt, 31, $. — * adgressus, 10, 1o.
BG.L2%6] Campaign against the Helvetii. 23
Fio. 16. — DarzaT or Tux Hatveru.
‘The Helvetii are Defeated with Great Loss. They Retreat.
26. Ita ancipiti proelid diü atque acriter pügnátum est. Diütius cum sustinére! nostrórum impetüs nón possent, alteri sé, ut coeperant, in montem recépérunt, alteri ad impedimenta? et carrós suds sé contulérunt Nam hóc tótó proelio, cum ab hori septimà ad vesperum pügnütum $5
Cf. ! sustiniret, p. 20, 1. 19. —? impedimenta, 21, 3
24 The Gallic War. [Casan
sit, iversum hostem vidére n&émó potuit. Ad multam noctem etiam ad impedimenta pügnátum est, proptereá quod pró válló carrós obiécerant et é locó superióre in nostros veni- entis téla coniciébant, et nón nülli! inter carrós rédásque
s matarás ac trügulis subiciébant nostrosque volnerübant. Dia cum esset piigndtum, impedimentis castrisque nostri potiti? sunt. Ibi Orgetorigis filia atque ünus é filiis captus est. Ex eó proelió circiter hominum mllia cxxx superfué- runt, eáque tótà nocte continenter* iérunt: [nüllam partem
to noctis itinere intermissó] in finis Lingonum dié quartó per- vénérunt, cum et propter volnera militum et propter sepul- türam occisórum nostri [triduum moráti] eds sequi nón potuissent. Caesar ad Lingonas litterás nüntiósque misit né eos frümentó néve alia ré iuvdrent; qui si iüvissent, sé
15 eódem locó qué Helvétiós habitürum. Ipse triduo inter- missó cum omnibus cópiis * eds sequi coepit.
Negotiations for Surrender.
27. Helvétii omnium rérum inopià adducti légátós dé déditione ad eum misérunt. Qui cum eum in itinere con- vénissent séque ad pedés próiécissent suppliciterque locüti
so flentés" pücem petissent, atque eds in ed locó qué tum essent suum adventum exspectüre iussisset, páruérunt. ES postquam Caesar pervénit, obsidés,” arma, servós qui ad eós perfügissent poposcit. Six Thousand Helvetii Flee, but Later are Captured.
Dum ea conquiruntur et cónferuntur," [nocte intermissá] #5 circiter hominum milia vt éius pági" qui Verbigenus appel- l&tur, sive timóre perterriti," né armis tráditis supplicio *
Cf. ! nda ntillde, p. 15, l. 5. —* potiri, 2, 16. — * continenter, 1, 10. — * pervénit, 10, 8. — * occisum, 7, 2. — * cbpils, 19, 7. —* Séns, 18, 3. — peteret, 18, 3. — * ad venta, 16, 12. — ” obsidés, 12, 18. — !! cSaferri, al, I. — !* pigus, 10, 12. — 4 perterritie, 20, 13. — M eupplició, 17, 6.
B.G.l28] Campaign against the Helvetii. 25
adficerentur, sive spé salütis inducti, quod in tantà multitü- dine déditiciorum suam fugam aut occultári aut omnino
Fic. 17. — Roman Swonps ( gladii).
ignorári posse existimárent,! primá nocte é castris Helvétio- rum égressi ad Rhénum finisque Germánorum contendérunt.
28. Quod ubi Caesar resciit, quórum per finis ierant, his uti conquirerent? et redücerent, si sibi pürgáti esse vellent, imperávit; reductós in hostium numero habuit ;? reliquos omnis, obsidibus, armis, perfugis traditis in déditionem* accépit.
The Helvetii Forced to Return.
Helvétios, Tulingós, Latobrigos in finis suds, unde erant profecti, reverti iussit; et quod omnibus frügibus amissis domi nihil erat quo famem tolerárent, Allobrogibus impe- ravit ut eis frümenti copiam * facerent; ipsos oppida vicos- que, quós incenderant,* restituere? iussit Id eà maximé ratione fécit, quod noluit eum locum unde Helvétii disces- serant* vacáre, né propter bonitatem agrórum Germáàni, qui trins Rhénum incolunt, é suis finibus in Helvétiorum finis trinsirent, et finitimi* Galliae provinciae Allobrogibusque essent. Boios petentibus Haeduis, quod égregià ? virtüte erant cogniti, ut in finibus suis conlocarent, concessit ; !
Cf. ! existimátürum, p. 18, 1. 1. — * conquiruntur, 24, 24. — * habitü- Tum, 24, 15. — * déditióne, 24, 18. —5 cópiam, 14, 3. — * incendunt, 4, 20. — restitütus, 16, 14. — * discédere, 20, 12. — ? finitimis, 16, 6. — V égregiam, 17, 5. — 4 concédere, 12, 17.
o
5
26 The Gallic War. [C^sAn
quibus illi agrós dedérunt, quosque posted in parem iüris libertátisque condicionem atque ipsi erant recépérunt.
Census of the Tribes Before and After their March.
29. In castris Helvétidrum tabulae repertae! sunt litteris Graecis confectae et ad Caesarem relatae, quibus in tabulis s nominátim ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset eorum qui arma ferre possent, et item séparátim guo? pueri, senés mulierésque. Quarum omnium rérum summa erat capitum Helvétiorum milium ccrLxrir, Tulingorum milium xxxvi, Lato- brigorum xim, Rauracorum xxi, Boiorum xxxir; ex his ro qui arma ferre possent, ad milia xci. Summa omnium fué- runt ad milia cccLxvirt. Eorum qui domum rediérunt cénsü habito, ut Caesar imperàáverat, repertus est numerus milium ^ cetx. Gallic Chiefs Congratulate Ceesar. 30. Bello Helvétiorum confecto totius feré Galliae légati, 15 principes civititum, ad Caesarem grátulàtum convénérunt: ' Intellegere sésé, tametsi pro veteribus? Helvétiorum iniüriis ^ populi Romàni ab his poends belló repetisset, tamen eam rem nón minus ex üsü terrae Galliae quam populi Romani accidisse ;* proptereà quod e6 consilio florentissimis rébus 20 domos suds Helvetii reliquissent,* uti tóti Galliae bellum inferrent imperioque potirentur’ locumque domicilio ex magna copia déligerent,° quem ex omni Gallia opportünissi- mum ac früctuosissimum iidicdssent, reliquasque civitatis stipendiáriàs habérent.’
They Request a Council.
25 Petiérunt uti sibi concilium totius Galliae in diem certam indicere idque Caesaris voluntate facere licéret:’ sésé habére
Cf. ! reperiébat, p. 16, l. 17. —? veteris, 12, 7. — * accidisset, 17, 25. 6, 26.
B. G. I. 31.] Campaign against Ariovistus. 27
quasdam rés quás ex commüni cónsénsü ab eó petere vel- lent. Ea ré permissá diem concilio cónstituérunt et iüre üürandó né quis énüntiáret,! nisi quibus commüni consilió mandátum esset, inter sé sánxérunt.
Private Interview with Csesar.
31 Eó concilio dimisso idem principés civitátum qui ante fuerant ad Caesarem revertérunt? petiéruntque uti sibi sécrétó [in occultó] dé sud omniumque salüte* cum eó agere*licéret. Ea ré impetrátá " sésé omnés flentés Caesari ad pedés proiécérunt:* ! Nón minus sé id contendere et laboráre, névea quae dixissent énüntiárentur, quam uti ea quae vellent impetrüárent; proptereà quod, si énüntiitum esset, summum in cruciátum sé ventüros vidérent.’
Speech of Diviciacus the Hssduan. He Complains of the Encroachments of the Germans.
Locütus* est pró his Diviciácus Haeduus: ‘Galliae totius factiónés esse duds; hàrum alterius principatum tenére Haeduos, alterius Arvernos. Hi cum tantopere dé poten- tàátü inter sé multos annos contenderent, factum esse uti ab Arvernis Séquanisque Germàáni mercéde arcesserentur. Hórum primó circiter milia xv Rhénum tránsisse; posteà- quam agros et cultum et cópiàs Gallorum hominés feri ac barbari adamássent, tráductos plüris; nunc esse in Gallia ad centum et xx milium numerum. Cum his Haeduos eórumque clientis semel atque iterum armis contendisse ; Dignam calamitátem pulsos? accépisse, omnem nobilitatem, omnem senátum, omnem equitátum àmisisse. Quibus proe- lis calamitatibusque fráctos, qui et sua virtüte et populi Rómáni hospitio atque amicitia plürimum ante in Gallia
Cf. ! &nüntlüri, p. 15,1. 14. — ? reverti, 25, 11. — ? salütis, 25, 1. — —‘égit, 11, 12. — 5 impetrat, 8, 10. — * prüiscissent, 24, 19. —? locüti, 14 19. —® pulsis, 9, 6. — &missis, 25, 11.
28 The Gallic War. | [CAxsAR
potuissent, coáctós! esse Séquanis obsidés dare nobilissimos civitatis, et iüre iürandó civitátem obstringere? sésé neque obsidés repetitürós* neque auxilium à populo Romano implo- rátürós neque recüsátüros quo minus perpetuo sub illorum 5 dicióne atque imperio essent. Unum sé esse ex omni civi- tate Haeduorum qui addüci nón potuerit ut iüráret aut liberos suos obsidés daret. Ob eam rem sé ex civitate profügisse et Romam ad senàtum vénisse auxilium pos- tulàtum, quod sólus neque iüre iürando neque obsidibus Io tenérétur.* The Hard Lot of the Sequani.
Sed péius victoribus Sequanis quam Haeduis victis acci- disse, proptereà quod Ariovistus, réx Germanorum, in eorum finibus consédisset tertiamque partem agri Séquani, qui esset optimus totius Galliae, occupávisset, et nunc dé alterà
15 parte tertià Séquanés décédere iubéret, propterea quod pau- cis ménsibus* ante Harüdum milia hominum xxiii ad eum vénissent, quibus locus ac sédés parárentur. Futürum esse paucis annis uti omnés ex Galliae finibus pellerentur atque omnés Germàni Rhenum transirent ; neque enim conferen-
20 dum esse Gallicum cum Germànorum agro, neque hanc consuétüdinem victüs cum illà comparandam.
Tyranny of Ariovistus.
- Ariovistum autem, ut semel Gallorum cópiás proelio vice- rit, quod proelium factum sit ad Magetobrigam, superbe et crüdéliter imperáre, obsidés nobilissimi cüiusque' liberos
25 poscere, et in eds omnia exempla cruciátüsque? édere, si qua rés nón ad nütum aut ad voluntátem éius facta sit. Hominem esse barbarum, irácundum, temerárium; non posse éius imperia diütius ? sustinéri.
Cf. ! coáüctus, p. 15, 1. 15.—? obstrictás, 8, 9. — *repetisset, 26, 17. — ‘tenéri, 19, 6. — 5 cónsédisse, 18, 14. — * ménsium, 4, 23. — 7 quisque, 17, 13.— ? poposcit, 24, 23. — * cruciátum, 27, 12. — V di, 23, 1.
B.G.L 32.) Campaign agaigs! Ariovistus. 29
The Gauls have no Hope but in Cesar.
Nisi quid in Caesare populóque Roómüno sit auxili, om- nibus Gallis idem esse faciendum quod Helvétii fécerint, ut domó émigrent, aliud domicilium aliás sédis remótàs à Germànis petant fortünamque, quaecumque accidat, experi- antur Haec si énintiata Ariovist6 sint, non dubitáre quin dé omnibus obsidibus qui apud eum sint gravissimum sup- plicium sümat. — Caesarem vel auctoritáte sud atque exercitüs vel recenti victérid vel nómine populi Romàni déterrére posse né maior multitüdó Germánorum Rhénum trádücátur,! Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti iniüriá posse défendere.’
The Sequani Remain Silent. Diviciacus Shows their Desperate Condition.
32. Hac orátióne ab Diviciaco habita omnés qui aderant magno flétü auxilium à Caesare petere coepérunt Animad- vertit Caesar ünos* ex omnibus Séquanos nihil edrum rérum facere quas céteri facerent, sed tristis capite démisso terram intueri; Eius rei quae causa esset mirátus ex ipsis quae- sit Nihil Séquani respondére, sed in eadem tristitià taciti permanére. Cum ab his saepius quaereret neque üllam omninó vocem exprimere posset, idem Diviciácus Haeduus respondit : *Hoc esse miseriorem et graviorem fortünam Séquanorum quam reliquorum, quod sóli né in occulto quidem queri * neque auxilium implóoráre audérent; absen- tisque Ariovisti crüdélitàtem, velut si córam adesset, horré- rent, proptereà quod reliquis tamen fugae facultas? darétur, Séquanis véro, qui intra finis suos Ariovistum recépissent, quorum oppida omnia in potestáte &ius essent, omnés cruci- àtüs essent perferendi.'
Cf.! tráductós, p. 27, 1. 20. — * coepit, 24, 16. — * ünum, 28, 5. — ! quaerendi, 16, 18. — 5 reliquis, 26, 23. — * querütur, 18, 9. —" facul- tite, 7, 4-
30 The G@lltc War. [C.rsar
Ceesar's Reasons for Checking Ariovistus.
33. His rébus cógnitis! Caesar Gallorum animós verbis cónfirmávit, pollicitusque* est sibi eam rem cürae futüram ; magnam sé habére spem et beneficio sud et auctoritate adductum Ariovistum finem iniüriis factirum. Hac oràti-
5 óne habità concilium dimisit. Et secundum ea multae rés eum hortábantur * quà ré sibi eam rem cógitandam et susci- piendam putáret: imprimis, quod Haeduos, frátrés consan- guinedsque * saepenumeró à senátü appellatos, in servitüte atque in dicione" vidébat Germánorum tenéri, eorumque
10 obsidés esse apud Ariovistum ac Séquanos intellegébat ; quod in tantó imperio populi Romàni turpissimum sibi et rei püblicae esse arbitrábátur Paulüátim autem Germános cOnsuéscere’ Rhénum tránsire et in Galliam magnam eorum multitüdinem venire, populo Romàno periculosum vidébat ;
r5 neque sibi homines feros ac barbaros temperatirés® existimà- bat quin, cum omnem Galliam occupàávissent, ut ante Cimbri Teutonique fécissent, in provinciam exirent atque inde in Italiam contenderent ; (praesertim cum Séquanos à próvincià nostra Rhodanus divideret]; quibus rébus quam mátürrime
20 Occurrendum putübat. Ipse autem Ariovistus tantos sibi spiritüs, tantam adrogantiam sümpserat, ut ferendus nón viderétur.
He Requests an Interview with Ariovistus, Who Declines.
34. Quam ob rem placuit ei ut ad Ariovistum légátós mitteret, qui ab eo postulárent uti aliquem locum medium 25 utriusque conloquio déligeret: velle sésé dé ré püblicà et summis utriusque rébus cum eó agere Ei légátióni Ario- vistus respondit: *Si quid ipsi à Caesare opus esset, sésé Cf. ! cbgnitus, p. 19, 1. 4. — ? polliciti, 13, 18. — * hort&tur, 17, 14.
—* consanguinei, 9, 19. — 5 dicióne, 28, 5. — * arbitribatur, 16, 28. —
! cSnsuérat, 20, 3. —* temperdtirds, 7, 5. — * agere, 27, 8. Y
B.G.1. 36] Campaign against Ariovistus. 31
ad eum ventürum fuisse; si quid ille sé velit, illum ad sé venire oportére.' Praetereà sé neque sine exerciti in eds partis Galliae venire audére* qués Caesar possidéret, neque exercitum sine mágnó commeati atque molimento in ünum locum contrahere posse. Sibi autem mirum vidéri? quid in sud Gallia, quam bello vicisset, aut Caesari aut omnino populo Rómàno negoti esset.’ Csesar Sends a Second Message Stating his Demands.
35. His responsis ad Caesarem relatis, iterum ad eum Caesar légátós cum his mandátis mittit: *Quoniam tantd suo populique Romani beneficio adfectus, cum in cónsulátü suo réx atque amicus à senátü appellátus esset, hanc sibi populoque Rém4n6 gratiam referret, ut in conloquium venire invitátus gravárétur neque dé commüni * ré dicendum sibi et cognoscendum putaret, haec esse quae ab eó postularet : primum, né quam multitüdinem hominum amplius* trans Rhénum in Galliam trádüceret ;, deinde obsidés quos habé- ret ab Haeduis redderet, Séquanisque permitteret ut quos illi habérent voluntate éius reddere illis licéret; neve Hae- duds iniürià lacesseretÜ néve his sociisque eórum bellum inferret. Si id ita fécisset, sibi populoque Románo perpe- tuam gratiam atque amicitiam cum eó futüram; si nón impetrdaret,’ sésé, — quoniam M. Messálà M. Pisóne cón- sulibus senátus cénsuisset uti quicumque Galliam provinciam obtinéret, quod commodo rei püblicae facere posset, Haeduos céterósque amicós populi Romani défenderet, — sé Haeduo- rum iniürias nón negléctürum.'
Ariovistus's Haughty Reply. 36. Ad haec Ariovistus respondit: *Iüs* esse belli ut
Cf. ! oportébat, p. 4, 1. 6. —3 audérent, 29, 21. — ? vidérentur, 6, 9. — * commiini, 27, r1. — "^ amplius, 20, 8. — 5 Jacessere, 13, 11. —! im- petrátà, 27, 8. —* ifiris, 26, 1.
32 The Gallic War. (CrsaR
qui vicissent els quós vicissent quem ad modum vellent imperárent; item populum Rómànum victis nón ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperüre cónsuésse.! Si ipse populó Rómàno non praescriberet quem ad modum
5 sud iüre üterétur, non oportére sésé à populo ROm4nd in suo iüre impediri. Haeduos sibi, quoniam belli fortüànam temptassent et armis congressi ac superati essent, stipendi- ürios? esse facts. Mágnam Caesarem iniüriam facere qui suó adventü vectigália? sibi déteriora faceret. Haeduis sé
r0 obsidés redditürum non esse, neque his neque eorum sociis iniürià bellum inlàtürum, si in eo manérent quod convénis- set stipendiumque quotannis penderent; si id nón fécis- sent, longé eis fraternum nómen populi Romani àfutürum. Quod sibi Caesar dénintidret s& Haeduorum iniürids non
15 negléctürum, néminem sécum sine sua pernicié* contendisse. Cum vellet, congrederétur ; intelléctürum quid invicti Ger- mani, exercitátissimi in armis, qui inter annos xiv téctum nón subissent, virtüte possent.'
Complaints of the Hsedui and Treveri. Cesar Hastens against Ariovistus.
37. Haec eodem tempore Caesari mandáta referébantur,'
20 et légati ab Haeduis et à Tréveris veniebant: Haedui ques- tum’ quod Harüdes, qui nüper in Galliam tránsportati essent, finis eórum populdrentur ;* sésé né obsidibus quidem datis pacem Ariovisti redimere potuisse; Tréveri autem, pàgós centum Suévorum ad ripam Rhéni cónsédisse, 25 qui Rhénum transire cónárentur; his praeesse Nasuam et Cimberium frátrés. Quibus rébus Caesar vehementer com- motus máàtürandum sibi existimávit, né, si. nova manus Suévórum cum veteribus cópiis Ariovisti sésé coniünxisset, minus facile resisti posset. Itaque ré frümentarià quam
Cf. ! cOnsuéscere, p. 30, 1. 13. — * stipendil riis, 26, 24. — ? vectigi- lia, 16, 1. — * inferret, 31, 20. — 5 perniciem, 17, 23. — 5 rel&tis, 31, 3. — queri, 29, 21. — * populübantur, 9, 13. — ? cOnsédisset, 28, 13. — V mátürat, 6, 15.
B. G. I. x / Campaign against Ariovistus. 33
celerrimé! potuit comparatd, mágnis itineribus ad Ariovistum contendit. Both Strive to Reach Vesontio.
38. Cum tridui* viam processisset, nüntiátum est ei Ario- vistum cum suis omnibus cópiis ad occupandum Vesontio- nem, quod est oppidum máximum Séquanorum, contendere, [triduique viam 4 suis finibus processisse]. Id né accideret? mágnopere sibi praecavendum Caesar existimábat. Namque omnium rérum quae ad bellum üsui erant summa erat in eo oppido facultás ; idemque nàtürà loci sic müniebafyr ut mignam ad dücendum bellum daret facultatem bropt ered quod 4 uiimen ,Dubis, ut circinó circumductum, paene totum oppidum cingit ; ; reliquum spatium, quod est nón amplius pedum sexcentorum, quà flümen intermittit, mons continet mágnà altitüdine, ita ut rddicés montis ex utráque parte ripae flüminis contingant, Hunc mürus circumdatus arcem efücit et cum oppido coniungit. Hiic Caesar magnis noc- turnis diurnisque itineribus contendit, occupátoque oppido ibi praesidium conlocat.
The Roman Soldiers are Panic-stricken.
39. Dum paucos diés ad Vesontionem rei frümentàriae commedtiisque® caus4 morátur,' ex pércontátione nostrérum vücibusque Gallorum ac mercatérum, qui ingenti magniti- dine corporum Germànos, incrédibili virtüte atque exercita- tióne in armis esse praedica$ant, — saepenumeró sésé cum his congresos? n& voltugi quidem atque aciem oculorum dicébant e potuisse, J- tantus subito timor omnem exer- citum occupávit ut non'mediocriter omnium mentis animos- que perturbaret. Hic primum ortus est à tribünis militum,
Cf. ! celeriter, p. 15, 1. 20. —? triduum, 24, 12. — ? accidat, 29, 4. — ! facultás, 29, 23. — § contenderent, 30, 18. — * commeátü, 31, 4. — 'moráti, 24, 12. — * saepenumeró, 3o, 8. — * congrederétur, 32, 16. — V erfontur, 2, $
Van un
20
28
34 The Gallic Was. [C.rsar
praefectis reliquisque, qui ex urbe amicitiae causáà Caesarem secüti nón magnum in ré militàri üsum habébant; 4uGrum alius alia causa inlata / quam sibi ad proficiscendum neces- süriam esse diceret, petébat ut éius voluntüte! disc&dere s licéret; noónnülli pudore adducti, ut timoris suspicionem vitirent, remanébant. Hi neque voltum fingere: neque interdum lacrimds tenére poterant; abditi® in tabernáculis aut suum fátum querébantur aut cum familidribus‘* suis commüne periculum miserábantur. "Volgo totis castris tes- 10 timenta obsignábantur. Horum vicibus ac timóre paulatim am ei qui mágnum in castris üsum habébant, milites cen- ^ turiónésque quique equitatui praeerant, perturbábantur. Qui ^ Sé ex his minus timidós existimári volébant, nón sé hostem veréri, sed angustiàás itineris et mágnitüdinem silvàrum quae 15 intercéderent inter ipsós atque Ariovistum, aut rem frümen- táriam, ut satis commodé® supportari posset, timére dicébant. Non nülli etiam Caesari nüntiábant, cum castra movéri ac signa ferri iussisset, nón fore dicto audientis milités neque propter timorem signa látüros.
Cesar Makes Light of their Fears, and Proposes to Advance at Once.
a0 40. Haec cum animadvertisset, convocátó consilio omni- umque órdinum ad id consilium adhibitis" centurionibus, vehementer eós incüsávit: primum quod aut quam in partem aut quo cónsilió dücerentur sibi quaerendum aut cogitan- dum? putárent. ^ Ariovistum sé cónsule cupidissimé populi as Romani amicitiam adpetisse ; cir hunc tam temeré quis- quam * ab officio discessürum iüdicáret? ? Sibi quidem persuddéri, cógnitis suis postulitis atque aequitate condi- ciónum perspectà, eum neque suam neque populi Romani Cf. 1 voluntáte, p. 31, 1. 18. — ? vitet, 18, 10. — ? abdidérunt, 1o, 12. —‘ familidrem, 17, 10. — 5 commodé, 22, 9. — * animadvertit, 29, 12. — adhibet, 18, 7. — * cOgitandam, 30, 6. — * quemquam, 17, 19. —
Y jüdicássent, 26, 23.
RGl40] Campaign against Ariovistus. 35
grütiam repudi&türum. Quod si furóre atque ámentiá impul- sus bellum intulisset, quid tandem verérentur? aut cür dé sui virtüte aut dé ipsius diligenti déspérárent?! Factum Gius hostis periculum patrum nostrórum memori4, cum Cim- bris et Teutonis à G&id Mario pulsis nón minorem laudem $ exercitus quam ipse imperátor meritus? vidébátur; factum etiam nüper in Italia servill tumultü, quós tamen aliquid
Fro. 19. — Manius.
üsus'ac disciplina quam à nóbis accépissent sublevárent.* Ex qué iüdicári posse quantum habéret in s& bon! cónstan)) tia, proptereà quod, quós aliquamdiü inermis sine causa 10 timuissent, hós posted armatés ac victórés superüssent Dénique* hós esse eósdem Germanés quibuscum saepe- tumerd Helvétil congressi, non solum in suis sed etiam in illrum finibus, plérumque superárint; qui tamen parés’ esse tostró exercitui nón potuerint. Si quós adversum proelium et 15 fuga Gallórum commovéret, hos, si quaererent, reperire posse diitunitate belli défatigatis Gallis Ariovistum, cum multós nénsis castris sé ac palüdibus tenuisset neque sui potesta- CL? dlispérüre, p. 16, 1. 17. — * meritóe, 9, 16. — ? üsum, 34, 2. — !nillevétur, 15, 1. — * supeziverint, 15, 11. —* dénique, 19, 13.— * perm, 26, 1.
36 The Gallic War. [C^xsAR
tem fécisset, déspérantis iam dé pügnà et dispersos subitó
adortum,' magis ratione et consilio quam virtüte vicisse.
Cui rationi contra hominés barbaros atque imperitos locus
fuisset, hac né ipsum quidem spéráre nostros exercitüs capi 5 posse.
Qui suum timorem in rei frümentáriae simulationem an- gustidsque itineris conferrent, facere adroganter, cum aut dé officio * imperatoris déspéráre aut praescribere* vidéren- tur. Haec sibi esse cürae ; frümentum Séquanos, Leucos,
ro Lingonés subministrare, iamque esse in agris frümenta ma- türa;* dé itinere ipsos brevi tempore iüdicatüros.
Quod nón fore dicto audientés neque signa latiri® dican- tur, nihil sé eá ré commovéri ; scire enim, quibuscumque * exercitus dictó audiéns non fuerit, aut male ré gesta fortinam
15 défuisse, aut aliquo? facinore compertó avaritiam esse con- victam; suam innocentiam perpetuà vita, félicitátem Hel- vétiórum belló esse perspectam.*
Itaque sé quod in longiorem diem conlátürus fuisset re- praesentatirum, et proximà nocte dé quartà vigilià castra
20 mótürum, ut quam primum intellegere posset utrum apud eds pudor? atque officium an timor plüs valéret.” Quod si praetereà némo sequátur,! tamen sé cum sola decima legione itürum, dé quà non dubitaret, sibique eam praetoriam cohor- tem futüram.' Huic legioni Caesar et indulserat praecipué
25 et propter virtütem confidébat maximé,
Effect of Caesar's Speech. He Advances.
41. Hac Gratidne habità mirum in modum conversae sunt omnium mentés, summaque alacritàs et cupiditas ! belli gerendi innáta est ; princepsque * decima legió per tribünós
Cf. ! adortus, p. 11,1. 17. — ? officio, 34, 26. — * praescriberet, 32, 4. — * mátüra, 13, 20. — 5 látürós, 34, 19. — 5 quaecumque, 29, 4. —’ ali- quem, 3o, 24. — * perspectá, 34, 28. — * pudóre, 34, 5. —? valeat, 15, § — 11 gecüti, 34, 2. — 13 cupidit&te, 8, 7. — !5 princeps, 10, 19.
B.G. 1.42] Campaign against Ariovistus. 37
militum ei grátiás! égit, quod dé sé optimum iüdicium fécis- set, séque esse ad bellum gerendum parátissimam cónfir- mavit. Deinde reliquae legiones cum tribünis militum et primorum órdinum centurionibus égérunt uti Caesari satis- facerent :* *Sé neque umquam dubitdsse neque timuisse 5 neque dé summa belli suum iüdicium, sed imperátoris esse existimavisse.’ Eórum satisfactione acceptà et itinere ex- — quisits per Diviciácum, quod ex aliis ei maximam fidem? habébat, ut milium amplius quinquagintà circuitü locis aper- tis exercitum düceret, dé quartà vigilia, ut dixerat, profectus 10 est. / Septimó dié, cum iter nón intermitteret, ab explorátó- ribus certior factus est Ariovisti copias à nostris milia pas- suum quattuor et viginti abesse.
Ariovistus Requests an Interview. Csesar’s Precautions.
42. Cognitó Caesaris adventü Ariovistus légàátos ad eum mittit: ‘Quod anteá dé conloquio * postulàsset, id per sé r$ fieri licére, quoniam propius accessisset, séque id sine peri- culo facere posse existimáret. Non respuit condicionem Caesar, iamque eum ad sàánitátem reverti arbitrabatur, cum id quod ante& petenti* dénegasset ultro pollicérétur; mag- namque in spem veniébat, pro suis tantis populique Rómáàni 20 in eum beneficiis, cognitis suis postulátis,? fore uti pertinaciá désisteret.
Diés conloquió dictus est ex ed dié quintus. Interim Yaepe cum légati ultro citroque inter eds mitterentur, Ario- vistus postulàvit né quem peditem ad conloquium Caesar 25 addiiceret: ‘Veréri sé né per insidias ab eó circumvenirétur; uterque cum equitátü veniret ; alià ratione sése nón esse ventürum.' Caesar, quod neque conloquium interposita causi tolli? volébat neque salütem suam Gallorum equi-
Cf.! grátiam, p. 31, l. 12. — ? satisfaciant, 12, 21. — ? fidem, 17, 11. —*conloquió, 30, 25. — * petébat, 34, 4. — * postulárent, 30, 24. — ' tolleret, 22, 2.
38 The Gallic War. [Casaz
titul committere audébat, commodissimum esse statuit, omnibus equis Gallis equitibus détractis, eó legiónàrios milites legionis decimae, cui quam maximé cénfidébat,! imponere, ut praesidium * quam amicissimum, si quid opus? $ factó esset, habéret. Quod cum fieret, nón inridiculé qui- dam ex militibus decimae legionis dixit plüs quam pollicitus esset Caesarem facere; pollicitum sé in cohortis praetóriae loco decimam legiónem habitürum ; * ad equum rescribere.
Cesar Pleads with Ariovistus, but Renews his Demands.
43. Plànitiés erat magna et in eà tumulus terrénus satis r0 grandis. Hic locus aequo feré* spatio ab castris Ariovisti et Caesaris aberat. Eo, ut erat dictum, ad conloquium vénérunt. Legionem Caesar quam equis dévéxerat passi bus ducentis ab eo tumulo constituit. Item equités Ariovisti pari interválló cónstitérunt.*| Ariovistus ex equis ut conlo- rs querentur et praeter sé dénós ad conloquium addücerent postulavit. Ubi eó ventum est, Caesar initió órátionis sua senüátüsque in eum beneficia commemorávit,. quod réx appellátus esset à senátü, quod amicus, quod münera amplissimé missa; quam rem et paucis contigisse et pro zo magnis hominum officiis cónsuésse tribui docébat ; illum, cum neque aditum neque causam postulandi iüstam habéret, benefició ac liberalitate sua ac senátüs ea praemia cónseci- tum. Docébat etiam quam veterés quamque iüstae causae necessitüdinis ipsis cum Haeduis intercéderent, quae senatis 25 consulta, quotiéns quamque honorifica in eds facta essent, ut omni tempore tótius Galliae principátum Haedui tenu- issent, prius etiam quam nostram amicitiam adpetissent. ‘Populi R6mani hanc esse cónsuétüdinem* ut sociós atque amicos nón modo sui nihil déperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, Cf. ! cónfidébat, p. 36, 1. 25. —? praesidio, 22, 1 5. — * opus, 3o, 27. — * habuit, 25, 7. — 5 fer, 26, 14. —* constiterant, 21, 1. — " commemo- shesent, 12, 2. —* cónsustüdinem, 28, 21.
B.G.1.44.) Campaign against Ariovistus. 39
honóre auctiórés vellet esse; quod véro ad amicitiam populi Romani adtulissent, id eis éripi! quis pati posset?! Postu- làvit deinde eadem quae légatis in mandatis dederat: né aut Haeduis aut eórum sociis bellum inferret ; obsidés red- deret;*[si nüllam partem Germánorum domum remittere posset, at né quos amplius Rhénum trànsire paterétur.
Ariovistus Arrogantly Repeats his Claims.
44. Ariovistus ad postuláta Caesaris pauca respondit; dé suis virtütibus multa praedicavit :* ‘Transisse Rhénum sésé nón sud sponte, sed rogátum et arcessitum à Gallis ; nón sine mágnà spé magnisque praemiis domum propinquésque * reliquisse ; sédis habére in Galliá ab ipsis concessás, obsidés ipsórum voluntáte datós ; stipendium capere iüre* belli quod victórés victis impónere cónsuérint. NNón sésé Gallis, sed Gallos sibi bellum intulisse ; omnis Galliae civitatis ad sé oppügnandum vénisse ac contra sé castra habuisse; eds omnis copiás à sé find proelio pulsds ac superátás esse. Si iterum experiri velint, sé iterum parátum esse décertdre ; si pace üti velint, iniquum esse dé stipendio recüsáre quod sud voluntate ad id tempus pependerint.’
Amicitiam populi Rómàni sibi 6rndmenté et praesidio,' nón détrimentd esse oportére, idque sé hac spé petisse. Si per populum Rómánum stipendium remittatur et déditicii? subtrahantur, nón minus libenter sésé recüsátürum populi Rom4ni amicitiam quam adpetierit.”
Quod multitüdinem Germánorum in Galliam tradücat, id sé sui müniendi, non Galliae impügnandae causa facere : élus rei testimonium esse quod nisi rogátus non venerit, et quod bellum nón intulerit, sed défenderit. Sé prius in
Cf. 1 éreptüri, p. 15, 1. 12. —? redditürum, 32, 10. — * praedicábant, 3» 23. — * propinquás, 16, 10. — 5 itis, 31, 27. — * iterum, 31, 8. — 32, 12. — 5 praesidium, 38, 4. — ? déditiciórum, 25, 2. —
? adpetissent, 38, 27.
40 The Gallic War. [C^oxsAn
Galliam vénisse quam populum Rómánum. Numquam ante hóc tempus exercitum populi Rómàni Galliae provinciae finibus égressum.! Quid sibi vellet? Cir in suds posses- sionés veniret? Provinciam suam hanc esse Galliam, sicut 5 illam nostram. Ut ipsi concédi* nón oportéret, si in nostros finis impetum faceret, sic item nds esse iniqués quod in suo iüre sé interpellárémus. Quod frátrés à senatü Haeduos appellatds diceret, non sé tam barbarum neque tam imperitum® esse rérum ut non 10 sciret neque bello Allobrogum proximo Haeduos Roómànis auxilium tulisse, neque ipsós, in his contentionibus quàs Haedui sécum et cum Séquanis habuissent, auxilió populi Roómáàni üsos esse. Débere* sé suspicári simulàtà Caesarem amicitià quem 15 exercitum in Gallia habeat sui opprimendi causá habére. Qui nisi décédat * atque exercitum dédücat ex his regionibus, sésé illum nón pró amicó, sed pró hoste habitürum. Quod si eum interfécerit multis sésé nobilibus principibusque populi Romani gratum esse factürum ; id sé ab ipsis per 20 eórum nüntiós compertum! habére quorum omnium grátiam atque amicitiam éius morte redimere? posset. Quod si dis- cessisset et liberam possessionem Galliae sibi trádidisset,? mágno sé illum praemió remünerátürum, et quaecumque bella geri vellet sine üllo eius labóre et periculó cónfectürum.' '
Csesar Does not Yield.
25 45. Multa ab Caesare in eam sententiam dicta sunt qua ré negótio !! désistere nón posset: * Neque suam neque populi Romàni cónsuétüdinem pati? uti optimé meritos socios désereret, neque sé iüdicáre Galliam potius esse
Cf. ! égreest, p. 25, 1. 4. —? concessit, 25, 20. — * imperitos, 36, 3. —‘ débeant, 15, 9. — * décédere, 28, 15. — * interfécerat, 10, 15. — T compertó, 36, 15. —* redimere, 32, 23. — ? tráditis, 25, 8. — ? cón- fecto, 26, 14. — !! negdti, 31, 7. — ? pati, 39, 2.
B.G.L46] Campaign against Ariovistus. 41
Ariovisti quam populi Romani. Belló superütos esse Arvernós et Ruténés ab Q. Fabio Maximo, quibus populus Románus ignóvisset neque in provinciam redégisset neque stipendium imposuisset. Quod si antiquissimum quodque tempus spectári oportéret, populi Rómàáni iüstissimum esse 5;
Pic. 21. — Coin oF THR FABIAN FAMILY.
\ in Gallia imperium ;' si iüdicium senátüs observüri opor- téret, liberam débére esse Galliam, quam belló victam suis légibus üti voluisset.'
The Germans Make a Treacherous Attack, and Cesar Withdraws.
46. Dum haec in conloquió geruntur,! Caesari nüntiátum est equités Ariovisti propius* tumulum accédere,* et ad nos- 10 tros adequitáre, lapidés télaque in nostrós conicere Caesar loquendi finem fécit, séque ad suds recépit suisque imperà- vit né quod omninó télum in hostis réicerent. Nam etsi sine ülló periculo legiónis déléctae cum equitátü proelium fore vidébat, tamen committendum nón putdbat, ut pulsis 15 hostibus dici posset eds ab sé per fidem in conloquio cir- cumventós.É Posteáquam in volgus militum élatum est qui adrogantiá in conloquio Ariovistus üsus omni Gallia Rómiánis interdixisset, impetumque’ in nostros éius equités fécissent, eaque rés conloquium ut dirémisset, multó maior 20 alacritás studiumque pügnandi màius exercitui iniectum est.
Ct. ! imperió, p. 28, 1. 5. — ? gerantur, 15, 13. — * propius, 37, 16. — * accessisset, 37, 16. — 5 coniciébant, 24, 4. — * circumvenirétur, 37,
36. —' impetum, 40, 6 Da
42 The Gallic War. [C-rsaz
Seisure of Two of Caesar's Envoys by Ariovistus.
47. Bidud post Ariovistus ad Caesarem légatds mittit : ‘Velle sé dé his rébus quae inter eds agi coeptae neque perfectae essent agere cum e6; uti aut iterum conloquio diem constitueret, aut, si id minus vellet, é suis légátis
§ aliquem ad sé mitteret, | Conloquendi Caesari causa visa nón est; et eo magis quod pridié? &ius diéi Germani reti- néri nón poterant quin téla in nostros conicerent, Légatum [é suis] sésé mágnó cum periculó ad eum missürum et homi- nibus feris obiectürum existimábat. | Commodissimum'!
ro visum est Gáium Valerium Procillum, C. Valeri Caburi filium, summa virtüte et hümàánitáte aduléscentem, — cüius pater à Gaid Valerio Flacco civitáte donátus erat, et propter fidem et propter linguae Gallicae scientiam, quà multa iam Ariovistus longinquá cónsuétüdine ütébátur, et quod in eo
15 peccandi Germdnis causa nón esset, — ad eum mittere, et M. Métium, qui hospitio * Ariovisti ütébátur. His man- dávit ut quae diceret Ariovistus cognoscerent et ad sé referrent | Quós cum apud sé in castris Ariovistus cón- spéxisset, exercitü suo praesente conclamavit : ‘Quid ad sé
20 venirent? an speculandi causá?' Conantis dicere prohibuit et in caténds coniécit.
Manceuvering and Skirmishing.
48. Eodem dié castra promóvit et milibus passuum sex à Caesaris castris sub monte consédit. Postridié* éius diei praeter castra Caesaris suas copids trádüxit et milibus pas-
25 suum duobus ultr& eum castra fecit, ed cónsilio uti frümento commeatique qui ex Séquanis et Haeduis supportàrétur Caesarem interclüderet. Ex eo dié diés continuos quinque Caesar pró castris suds cópiás prodüxit et aciem instrüctam*
Cf. ! cOnstituérunt, p. 27, 1. 2. — ? pridié, 20, 13. — * commodissi-
mum, 38, 1. — * hospitid, 27,26. — 5 referébantur, 32, 19. —* postridié, 20, 5. — " interclüdi, 20, 15. — * Iinstrüxit, 20, 21.
BG.L 48.) Campaign against Ariovistus. 43
Fic. 23. — Mar or Tux CAMPAIGN WITH ARIOVISTUS.
habuit, ut, si vellet Ariovistus proelio contendere,(ei potes- tas? non deésset.? Ariovistus his omnibus diébus itum castris continuit, equestri proelió cotidié* contendit.
German Method of Fighting.
Genus hóc erat pügnae qué sé Germàni exercuerant. Equitum milia erant sex, totidem numeró pedités vélócissimi
Ct. potestátem, p. 35, L 18.—* défuisse, 36, 15. —? cotidié, 13, 17.
44 The Gallic War. [Casan
ac fortissimi, quós ex omni cópiá singuli singulos suae sala- tis causá délégerant ; cum his in proeliis versábantur. Ad eds sé equités recipiébant ;* hi, si quid erat dürius, concur- rébant ; s! qui graviore? volnere acceptd equó déciderat,
5 circumsistébant ; si qué erat longius prodeundum aut cele- rius? recipiendum, tanta erat horum exercitátione celeritas ut iubis subleváti equórum cursum adaequarent.
Caesar Fortifies another Camp.
49. Ubi eum castris sé tenére Caesar intelléxit, né diütius commeata prohibérétur, ultra eum locum qué in locó Ger-
Fro. 23.—Sorpiess ATTACKED WHILE ENCAMPING.
1o máni cónséderant, circiter passüs sexcentós ab his, castris idóneum locum délégit, aciéque triplici instrüctá ad eum locum vénit. Primam et secundam aciem in armis esse, tertiam castra munire* iussit. Hic locus ab hoste circiter
Cf. ! recipit, p. 41, L 12. —? gravidrem, 29, 19. —* celerrim, 33, 1. — munilbátur, 33,9
BB.G.L 51.) Campaign against Ariovistus. 45
passüs sexcentos, uti dictum est, aberat. Eo circiter homi- num numeró sédecim milia expedita cum omni equitátü Ariovistus misit, quae cópiae nostros terrérent! et münl- tione prohibérent. Nihilo sécius Caesar, ut ante cónstitu- erat, duds aciés hostem propulsare, tertiam opus perficere 5 iussit Maürnitis castris duds ibi legionés reliquit et partem auxiliórum,* quattuor reliquás in castra máiora redüxit.
More Skirmishing, but No General Engagement. '
50. Proximo dié institütó suo Caesar é castris utrisque® cópids suds édüxit, paulumque à màioribus castris progres- sus aciem instrüxit, hostibus pügnandi potestátem fécit. 10 Ubi né tum quidem eós pródire* intelléxit, circiter meridié exercitum in castra redüxit. Tum démum Ariovistus partem sudrum cópiárum quae castra minóra* oppügnáret misit. Acriter utrimque üsque ad vesperum pügnátum es olis occásü* suds copids Ariovistus multis et inlatis’ et acceptis 15 volneribus in castra redüxit.
Reason for the Germans' Delay.
Cum ex captivis quaereret Caesar quam ob rem Ariovistus proelió nón décertdret,® hanc reperiébat causam, quod apud Germánós ea cónsuétüdó esset ut matrés familiae eorum sortibus et váticinátionibus déclàrárent utrum proelium 20 committi ex üsü* esset necne ; eds ita dicere : *Non esse fas Germánós superáre, si ante novam lünam proelio con- tendissent.’
Cesar Forces a Battle.
5l. Postridié éius diéi Caesar praesidio utrisque castris quod satis esse visum est reliquit, àlários omnis in cónspectü 25 hostium pró castris minoribus cónstituit," quod minus multi-
Cf} perterriti, p. 24, l. 26. —* auxilia, 20,23. — uterque, 37, 27. —
! pródeundum, 44, 5. —* minbrem, 35, 5. — * occásum, 2, 9. — intule- tat, 1o, 19. —* dicertáre, 39, 17. — * üsü, 26, 18. — ?? constituit, 38, 13.
46 The Gallic War. [CasA x
tüdine militum legionáriorum _pro | hostium numero valébat, ut ad speciem àláriis üterétur; ipse triplici instrüctá acie üsque ad castra hostium accessit Tum démum necessárió Germáni suas cópiàs castris édüxérunt generátimque cGn- § stituérunt paribus intervallis, Harüdés, Marcomannos, Tri- bocés, Vangionés, Nemetés, Sedusios, Suévós, omnemque aciem suam rédis et carris circumdedérunt, né qua spés in fugà relinquerétur. E6 mulierés* imposuérunt, quae ad
proelium proficiscentis, passis manibus flentes, implorábant Io né sé in servitütem Romànis tráderent.
Description of the Battle.
52. Caesar singulis* legionibus singulos légátós et quae- storem praefécit,’ uti eos testis * suae quisque virtütis habé- ret; ipse à dextro cornü, quod eam partem minimé firmam hostium esse animadverterat, proelium commisit. f Ita nostri
15 ücriter in hostis signo dato impetum fécérunt, ifa-que hostes repente celeriterque prócurrérunt ut spatium" pila in hostis coniciendi nón darétur. Réiectis pilis cominus gladiis püg- nátum est. At Germàni celeriter ex cónsuétüdine sud phalange facté impetüs gladiorum excépérunt. Reperti
2o Sunt complürés nostri qui in phalanga® insilirent et scüta manibus revellerent et désuper volnerdrent. Cum hostium aciés à sinistro cornü pulsa atque in fugam coniecta esset, à dextró cornü vehementer multitüdine sudrum nostram aciem premébant. Id cum animadvertisset P. Crassus
2s aduléscéns,” qui equitátui praeerat, quod expeditior! erat quam ei qui inter aciem versábantur, tertiam aciem laboran- tibus nostris subsidio misit.
Cf. ! valéret, p. 36, 1l. 21. — * accédere, 41, 10. — * mulierés, 26, 7. — * singuli, 44, 1. — 5 praeficit, 8, 22. —* testem, 12, 24. — " spatium, 7, 6. — * phalange, 21, 4. —* sinistrá, 22, 8. — 1? aduléscentem, 42, 11. —
11 expedita, 45, 2.
^OuzaH1137 SORYAOL ONIXOOI ‘MIEHLED MOXA ASIA — TE “OIG
*.G.Ls3] — Campaign against Ariovistus. 47
53. Ita proelium restitütum est atque omnés hostés terga vertérunt, neque prius fugere déstitérunt! quam ad flümen C£. ! désistere, p. 40, L 26.
48 The Gallic War. [CazsAn
Rhénum, milia passuum ex eo locó circiter quinque, pervénérunt. Ibi perpauci aut viribus cónfisi! tránare contendérunt aut lintribus? inventis sibi salütem repperé- runt. In his fuit Ariovistus, qui náviculam déligátam ad 5 ripam nactus ea profügit; reliquos omnis cónsecüti equités nostri interfécérunt. [Duae fuérunt Ariovisti uxórés, fina Suéva nátione, quam domo sécum düxerat, altera Norica, régis Vocciónis soror, quam in Gallia düxerat à fritre missam ; utraque in eá fuga periit Duae filiae hárum ro altera occisa, altera capta est. Gdaius Valerius Procillus, cum à custédibus® in fugà trinis caténis* vinctus traheré- tur, in ipsum Caesarem hostis equitütü insequentem inci- dit Quae quidem rés Caesari nón minorem quam ipsa victoria voluptátem adtulit, quod hominem honestissimum 1$ provinciae Galliae, suum familiárem et hospitem, éreptum é manibus hostium, sibi restitütum vidébat; neque éius calami- tate dé tanta voluptate et grátulátione quicquam fortüna déminuerat. Is sé praesente dé sé ter sortibus * consultum dicébat utrum igni statim necáarétur an in aliud tempus 20 reservárétur ; sortium beneficid sé esse incolumem. Item M. Métius repertus et ad eum reductus est.
The Army Goes into Winter Quarters. Cesar Goes to Hither Gaul.
54. Hoc proelid trans Rhénum nüntiáto Suévi, qui ad ripás Rhéni vénerant, domum reverti" coepérunt; quos Ubii, qui proximi Rhénum incolunt, perterritos insecüti
25 magnum ex eis numerum occidérunt. Caesar find aestate duóbus maximis bellis cónfectis, mátürius* pauló quam tempus anni postulabat, in hiberna in Séquanos exercitum dédüxit ; hibernis Labiénum praeposuit ; ipse in citeriorem Galliam ad conventüs agendos profectus est.
Cf. ! cónfidébat, p. 36, 1. 25. —* lintribus, ro, 4. —? cust5dés, 18, r1. —‘ catbnis, 42, 21. — * déminüta, 16, 13. — * sortibus, 45, 20. — re- verti, 37, 18. —* mitürrimé, 30, 19.
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THE BELGIAN CONFEDERACY. B.C. 57.
AI the Belgian Tribes Conspire against the Romans. Reasons for this.
'UM esset Caesar in citeriore Gallia ita uti supra dé- mónstrávimus, crébri ad eum rümorés adferébantur,' litterisque item Labiéni certior? fiébat omnis Belgás, quam tertiam esse Galliae partem dixerámus, contra populum Rómánum coniüráre obsidésque inter sé dare. Coniürandi has esse causás: primum quod verérentur * né omni pácáta Gallia ad eds exercitus noster addücerétur ; deinde quod ab nón nàüllis Gallis sollicitárentur, — partim qui, ut Germànos diütius in Gallia versári * noluerant, ita populi Rómánl exer- citum hiemáüre atque inveteráscere in Gallià molesté feré- bant; partim qui móbilitáte et levitate animi novis imperiis studébant, — ab nón niillis etiam, quod in Gallia à potentióri- bus atque els qui ad condücendós hominés facultatis habé- bant volgó régna occupübantur, qui minus facile eam rem imperió nostro cónsequi* poterant.
Cf. ! adtulit, p. 48, 1. 14. — certior, 37, 12. —* veréri, 34, 14.—
* versübantur, 44, 2. — 5 cónsecütum, 38, 22.
10
go The Gallic War. [Cesar
Caesar promptly Moves against them.
2. His nüntils litterisque commotus Caesar duds legiónés in citeriore Gallia novas cónscripsit, et inità aestáte! in in- teriorem Galliam qui dédüceret. Q. Pedium légàtum misit. Ipse, cum primum pàbuli copia esse inciperet, ad exercitum
$ vénit. Dat negotium Senonibus reliquisque Gallis qui fini- timi Belgis erant, uti ea quae apud cos gerantur cognóscant séque dé his rébus certiorem faciant. Hi cénstantey omnés nintidvérunt manüs* cógi, exercitum in ünum locum con düci. Tum véró dubitandum non existimavit quin ad eos io proficiscerétur. Ré frümentárià comparátà castra movet diébusque circiter quindecim ad finis Belgárum pervenit. The Remi Submit and Promise Aid.
3. E6 cum dé improviso celeriusque? omnium opinione vénisset, Rémi, qui proximi Galliae ex Belgis sunt, ad eum